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Between the Hockey Rink and the 
Voting Booth 
THE ADA AND ABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY IN THE EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Tennessee v. Lane1 on May 17, 2004, there has been a flurry of 
cases questioning the validity of abrogation of sovereign 
immunity by Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA Title II”)2 in various public service contexts.3  Two cases, 
McNulty v. Board of Education of Calvert County4 and 
Association for Disabled Americans v. Florida International 
University,5 have considered whether the ADA validly 
abrogates Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for 
private suits alleging violations of Title II in the educational 
context.  These two cases yielded conflicting results.  This Note 
argues that only the latter, in its finding that private 
individuals may sue the state for violations of Title II in the 
  
 1 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
 2 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12150 (2000). 
 3 See, e.g.,  Bill M. ex rel. William M. v. Neb. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Servs. Fin. and Support, 408 F.3d 1096, 1100 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that Lane only 
applies to the specific right of access to courts and related claims and rejecting suit 
under Title II for denial of certain Medicaid-funded services); Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 
1248, 1272-74 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that the “negative obligation” of the Eighth 
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, as opposed to the 
positive due process guarantee of accessible courts, makes abrogation a 
disproportionate remedy in the prison context when the Eighth Amendment right is 
“the only right at issue”); Simmang v. Texas Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 346 F .Supp. 2d 874, 
882 (W.D. Tex. 2004) (finding that Eleventh Amendment immunity is not validly 
abrogated by the ADA Title II for allegations against the state board of law examiners 
because “the right to practice law is not a fundamental right for the purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment” (quoting Tolchin v. Supreme Court of N.J., 111 F.3d 1099, 
1114 (3d Cir. 1997))); Haas v. Quest Recovery Servs., 338 F. Supp. 2d 797, 803 (N.D. 
Ohio 2004) (finding that sovereign immunity is not abrogated in a suit against the 
state for inaccessibility of drug rehabilitation treatment facilities, relying heavily on 
divide between legislation protecting due process rights and equal protection 
guarantees). 
 4 No. Civ. A. DKC 2003-2520, 2004 WL 1554401 (D. Md. July 8, 2004). 
 5 405 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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educational context, correctly applied Lane and, further, that 
this decision should have extended to acknowledge the 
possibility of valid abrogation authorizing the imposition 
of liability for violations of both due process and equal 
protection guarantees. 
In Lane, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth 
Circuit’s remand of the ADA Title II claim of George Lane, a 
paraplegic confined to a wheelchair, against the state of 
Tennessee for the denial of “access to, and the services of, the 
state court system.”6  The Court found that Mr. Lane asserted a 
valid claim for equitable relief and damages against the state 
under the ADA Title II.7  The finding that Title II validly 
abrogated state sovereign immunity in the context of access to 
courts was a central focus of the Court’s holding.  McNulty was 
decided on July 8, 2004 in the District Court of Maryland and 
purports to follow Lane.  In McNulty, a high school student 
brought a claim under the ADA Title II against the Calvert 
County Board of Education.8  The district court dismissed the 
claim, finding that state immunity was not validly abrogated 
by the ADA in the context of public education because 
disability is not a suspect class and education is not a 
fundamental right.9  In Association for Disabled Americans, 
plaintiffs with hearing impairments brought suit for equitable 
relief against Florida International University (“FIU”) alleging 
that the University’s failure to provide appropriate interpreters 
and other assistance violated the ADA Title II.10  The Eleventh 
Circuit reversed the Southern District of Florida’s decision 
granting FIU’s motion to dismiss based on Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.11  
  
 6 Lane, 541 U.S. at 513-15. 
 7 Id. at 515. 
 8 McNulty, 2004 WL 1554401, at *2. The defendants included the “Board of 
Education of Calvert County; J. Kenneth Horsmon, superintendent of Calvert County 
Public Schools; Kathryn Coleman, director of student services; Raymond D’Arienzo, 
supervisor of student services; George Miller, principal of Northern High School; Craig 
Hunter, vice principal of Northern High School; Karen Neal, former vice principal of 
Northern High School; and James Parent, principal of the Calvert Career Center.” Id. 
 9 The McNulty court dismissed a Title II claim for money damages for failure 
to state a claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Id. at *2, 
8. 
 10 Ass’n for Disabled Ams. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1292 (S.D. 
Fla. 2001), rev’d by 405 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 11 Ass’n for Disabled Ams. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 405 F.3d 954, 959 (11th Cir. 
2005). 
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This Note will argue that Lane prescribed the result in 
Association for Disabled Americans and that McNulty, in 
contrast, took an inappropriately narrow view of Lane by 
summarily foreclosing the possibility of maintaining private 
actions for education claims under the ADA Title II solely 
because education is not considered a fundamental right under 
the Federal Constitution.  Although the Lane Court gave 
substantial weight to the fact that the right at issue was access 
to courts, the fundamental nature of the right is not entirely 
controlling in the determination of whether federal legislation, 
and specifically the ADA Title II, may properly abrogate states’ 
immunity to private suits pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s section 5 power.  Association for Disabled 
Americans acknowledged this but did not engage in a 
comprehensive analysis of the claim in the educational context 
sufficient to support future differentiation from claimed 
violations in other public service contexts.  In arguing that the 
Eleventh Circuit reached the proper result, this Note also seeks 
to supplement the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in two ways: 
First, this discussion more thoroughly demonstrates why the 
educational context presents a special case for valid abrogation.  
Second, it argues that abrogation is valid with regard to claims 
that implicate either the due process or equal protection 
guarantee. 
Part II will briefly discuss the scope, purpose, and 
requirements of the ADA generally and Title II specifically.  
Next, Part III will discuss the evolution of the abrogation 
analysis and what the Lane decision added to the established 
standard, specifically addressing the question of whether Title 
II validly abrogates sovereign immunity.  Part IV will 
illustrate, using the case examples of McNulty and Association 
for Disabled Americans, how courts should apply this standard 
acknowledging that the fundamental right consideration was 
not dispositive in Lane.  The McNulty court should not have 
dismissed the claim under Title II relying solely on the premise 
that when a nonfundamental right is at issue, the ADA’s 
abrogation of sovereign immunity under Title II cannot under 
any circumstances be valid.  Association for Disabled 
Americans reached the proper result but should have also 
engaged in a thorough abrogation analysis sufficient to support 
future similar decisions in the context of public education.  This 
last part of the Note will suggest a comprehensive alternative 
analysis that district courts, like the McNulty court, should use 
to maintain consistency with precedent, including Lane.  
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Unlike the McNulty court’s method, this analysis considers the 
impact of the educational context on the abrogation question.  
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, TITLE II 
Based on extensive legislative findings that contributed 
to a lengthy and influential legislative history, Congress passed 
the Americans with Disabilities Act12 in 1990.  The final version 
included summaries of the findings and purposes of the law.13  
Two important summary findings relate that  
some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental 
disabilities, and [that] this number is increasing as the population as 
a whole is growing older [and] discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, 
housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, 
communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, 
voting, and access to public services . . . .14   
To remedy growing and pervasive discrimination in 
these “critical” areas, Congress purported to invoke both the 
Article I commerce power and the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
“sweep of Congressional authority.”15  The latter authority, 
section 5 enforcement power, may be invoked to implement the 
equal protection or due process guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Under this authority, the ADA Title II asserts 
“no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of 
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied 
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”16   
  
 12 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). 
 13 42 U.S.C. § 12101 outlines the findings and purposes behind the drafting 
and passing of the ADA as a whole.  Titles I, II, and III address discrimination against 
people with disabilities in different contexts.  Title I addresses employment, Title II 
addresses public services, programs, and activities, and Title III addresses public 
accommodations. See id. §§ 12101. This section briefly summarizes the lengthy 
legislative history behind the Act and then focuses on the specifics of Title II. 
 14 Id. § 12101(a)(1), (a)(3). 
 15 Id. § 12101(b)(4).  Abrogation of sovereign immunity pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause has long been considered an invalid use of Congressional power.  
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 79 (2000).   
 16 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).  See 28 C.F.R. § 35.149 (2000) (implementing 
regulations of the ADA Title II nondiscrimination requirement); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
12131(1) (2000) (“The term ‘public entity’ means any State or local government . . . .”); 
[T]he term ‘qualified individual with a disability’ means an individual with a 
disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or 
practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation 
barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential 
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To guard against disability discrimination, Title II’s 
requirement of “reasonable modifications”17 and corresponding 
regulations outline how public entities are required to modify 
existing services and facilities18 and construct new facilities.19  
Importantly, the regulations include the significant 
qualification that they do not “[r]equire a public entity to take 
any action that it can demonstrate would result in a 
fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or 
activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens.”20 
The enforcement provision of Title II routes through 
other legislative acts, including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 196421 via the Rehabilitation Act,22 providing that an 
aggrieved individual may bring a civil action for injunctive 
relief, and possibly compensatory damages.23  It is this 
enforcement provision, combined with the ADA’s express 
abrogation of states’ sovereign immunity,24 that is the focus of 
the controversy over whether the ADA as a whole, or the Titles 
individually, validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity.  Congress included the abrogation of sovereign 
immunity to serve as a powerful tool to protect “individuals 
with disabilities [because they] are a discrete and insular 
minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, 
subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and 
relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our 
society . . . .”25  This abrogation provision is a major component 
  
eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in 
programs or activities provided by a public entity. 
Id. § 12131(2).  See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2000) for definitions generally.   
 17 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000). 
 18 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 (2000). 
 19 Id. § 35.151 (2000). 
 20 Id. § 35.150(a)(3). See also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004) 
(discussing the “reasonable measures” the legislation requires in the proportionality 
assessment); infra Part IV.C.4 (discussing how these internal limitations rebut the 
argument that the legislation is overbroad and seeks to enforce more than irrational 
disability discrimination). 
 21 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d7 (2000). 
 22 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). 
 23 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000) has been interpreted to provide for damages 
relief. Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 598-601 (1983) (explaining 
that the drafters of Title VI aimed primarily at the provision of “preventive relief,” but 
that victims of intentional discrimination may also be entitled to compensatory 
damages); see also Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REV. 653, 655 
n.11 (discussing the use of Title VI remedies for application of the ADA Title II and 
possible interpretive problems arising from incorporation of those remedies). 
 24 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000). 
 25 Id. § 12101(a)(7). 
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of the ADA’s goal of providing “a clear and comprehensive 
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.”26  
III. THE STANDARD FOR ABROGATION 
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Eleventh Amendment27 to hold nonconsenting states immune 
from suits by citizens of other states and citizens of their own 
states.28  The ADA expressly abrogates states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity to private suits when a claim is brought 
due to a violation of the Act: 
A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State 
court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter.  In any 
action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this 
chapter, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are 
available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies 
are available for such a violation in an action against any public or 
private entity other than a State.29 
Generally, the Court has deemed abrogation of this 
immunity valid in some instances when Congress acts 
pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment section 5 power, but 
never when Congress acts pursuant to Article I.30  In order for 
  
 26 Id. § 12101(b)(1). 
 27 “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend 
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. XI.  There are, however, four prominent instances in which suits 
against a state are permitted.  The United States may sue a state.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 141 (1965).  States may sue each other under 
certain circumstances.  See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 182 n.9 (1982).  
A private individual may sue a state officer for prospective injunctive relief.  See, e.g., 
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 165-67 (1908).  Finally, an individual may sue the state 
or a state agency when the Eleventh Amendment immunity is validly abrogated by 
section 5.  See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). The fourth instance 
is at issue here. 
 28 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001).  
(reiterating this interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment immunity, citing the line of 
cases extending the immunity). See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, 
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.35 (2d ed. 2004) (addressing progression of 
interpretations of Eleventh Amendment immunity). 
 29 42 U.S.C. § 12202.  
 30 See supra note 15.  There are some instances in which the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s section 5 power may abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity because 
the Fourteenth Amendment is directed specifically at imposing some limitations on the 
state and such limitations may sometimes be “appropriate legislation” to enforce 
provisions of section 1.  This valid abrogation pursuant to section 5 relies heavily on 
the chronology and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it was adopted after the 
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Congress to validly abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to 
section 5, Congress must (1) explicitly intend to abrogate 
sovereign immunity, and (2) be legislating within the bounds of 
the power granted to Congress by section 5.31 
A. Express Intent to Abrogate 
The first part of the analysis, express statutory intent to 
abrogate, generally presents a low bar and is answered 
affirmatively in most instances.32  In Lane, for example, the 
Court found that section 12202 of the ADA unequivocally 
expressed Congress’s intent to abrogate sovereign immunity to 
private suits by simply looking at the statutory language.33  The 
second “predicate question,”34 whether abrogation was within 
Congress’s grant of power, is more complicated. 
B. Section Five Enforcement Power and the Boerne 
Proportionality Test 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress 
the power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment through “appropriate legislation.”35  Congress may 
invoke this power to enforce the due process and equal 
protection guarantees of section 1:  
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
  
Eleventh and for the purpose of limiting state power to protect national citizens.  
Article I legislation, for similar reasons, cannot validly abrogate immunity.  Fitzpatrick 
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-54. (1976); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 
72-73 (1996); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727 (2003).  See also 
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 388-89 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Colker, supra note 23, at 701 (2000) 
(emphasizing that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act unquestionably abrogates sovereign 
immunity and it is only a question of when, not if, Congress may so abrogate).   
 31 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72 (2000) (citing these 
instances). 
 32 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726 (citing the “clarity” of Congress’ intent to 
abrogate immunity in the Family Medical Leave Act); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363-64 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12202 as an unequivocal expression of abrogating sovereign 
immunity in beginning examination of Title I); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 78 (finding that suits 
against the states are authorized by the ADEA). 
 33 Lane, 541 U.S. at 517-18. 
 34 Id. at 517. 
 35 “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.  
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process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.36   
In City of Boerne v. Flores,37 the Court developed a test 
to determine the validity of legislation enacted pursuant to the 
section 5 enforcement power.  Boerne was concerned with the 
ability of Congress to pass legislation pursuant to section 5, not 
with abrogation of sovereign immunity.  Boerne’s test, however, 
is important here because it demonstrates when Congress may 
act pursuant to its section 5 power, the second component of 
the abrogation analysis.38 Such legislation must be remedial 
and not substantive,39 and it must be congruent and 
proportional to identified violations.40   
The Boerne court found that the Religious Freedom and 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) was not remedial because the 
legislative record lacked evidence of violations during the forty 
years preceding the Act’s passage.41  The Court agreed that the 
scope of the right at issue was the constitutional right to free 
exercise of religion,42 but asserted, in essence, that there were 
not recent and significant violations to remedy.43  Second, the 
Court found that the legislation attempted to change the way 
courts reviewed claims brought under the Due Process Clause 
  
 36 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 37 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In Boerne, the Court invalidated the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 determining that its proposed remedy was 
disproportionate to the enforcement of constitutional guarantees and instead was 
aimed at changing the content of those guarantees.  Id. at 532. 
 38 The first component is that the legislation explicitly outline its intention to 
abrogate sovereign immunity, as discussed supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
 39 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 521.   
 40 Id. at 520. 
 41 Id. at 530. 
 42 Id. at 519.  This is the determination of the “scope” of the constitutional 
right at stake.  In other cases, the scope of the right is less clear and depends on the 
questions of whether the alleged violation of the right involves a suspect classification 
or implicates a fundamental right.  See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) 
(disability is not a suspect classification and access to courts is a fundamental right); 
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003) (gender classification 
warrants heightened scrutiny); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 
366 (2001) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), and 
reiterating that disability classifications are not suspect and warrant only rational 
basis review); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (age is not a suspect 
classification and warrants only rational basis review).   
 43 The Boerne court engages in a lengthy examination of section 5, including 
history of the Framers’ intent and use of the enforcement power, to support the 
proposition that it is a remedial and not substantive power.  Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520-
29. 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment,44 risking substantively 
changing the amendment’s guarantees.  The Court 
implemented a test of congruence and proportionality to 
determine where this line exists between permissible remedial 
and impermissible substantive use of the enforcement clause.45   
In making the congruence and proportionality 
determination, the Boerne Court examined the Congressional 
record to determine whether Congress enacted the legislation 
due to historical and continuing constitutional violations.  The 
Court relied on the dearth of current and pervasive instances of 
violations to identify the Act’s most serious shortcoming:46 the 
legislation’s failure to be proportional to any constitutional 
violation described in the legislative history.47  This 
determination was based on the Court’s perception of the 
expansive and interminable sweep of the legislation that 
reached many laws unlikely to violate any constitutional 
rights.48  RFRA explicitly required the state to show a 
compelling interest for certain legislation where the Court had 
previously determined that due process required less stringent 
review of similar state legislation.  RFRA’s fatal breadth was 
evident because of the lack of relevant legislative history 
documenting constitutional violations.49  The permissible 
  
 44 Id. at 535.  Congress was trying to reestablish a standard of review the 
Court had rejected in Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).   
 45 The Court emphasized that  
Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right 
is.  It has been given the power “to enforce,” not the power to determine what 
constitutes a constitutional violation.  Were it not so, what Congress would be 
enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the “provisions of [the 
Fourteenth Amendment].” . . . While the line between measures that remedy 
or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive 
change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have 
wide latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must be 
observed.  There must be a congruence and proportionality between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.  
Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation 
and effect.  History and our case law support drawing the distinction, one 
apparent from the text of the Amendment.  
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5, brackets in 
original). 
 46 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. The Court found the disproportionality more fatal 
than the lack of legislative evidence: “[L]ack of support in the legislative record . . . is 
not [the legislation’s] most serious shortcoming.” Id. at 531.   
 47 The Court concluded that the legislation “is so out of proportion to a 
supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, 
or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”  Id. at 532. 
 48 Id. 
 49 The recent cases dealing with sovereign immunity have similarly looked to 
the Congressional findings before making a determination as to whether legislation is 
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breadth of a remedial statute narrows as the constitutional 
violations contemplated by Congress and demonstrated in the 
legislative history, the foundational concerns of the statute, 
diminish.50  
Boerne is important because it lays out the congruence 
and proportionality test, the second piece of the abrogation 
analysis.  Because in most cases the question as to whether a 
statute intends to abrogate is easily answered, congruence and 
proportionality becomes decisive in the abrogation inquiry. 
C. Setting the Stage for Lane:  Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v. Garrett51 
Garrett is the most relevant precedent to Lane for the 
purposes of this discussion, having applied the test for 
abrogation in its entirety to ADA claims.  The Garrett Court 
cited express intent to abrogate in the ADA, identified the 
scope of the right at stake, and assessed the congruence and 
proportionality of Title I.52  Garrett involved the cases of two53 
  
congruent and proportional to Congress’ objectives that are supposed to be based on 
those findings.  See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003) 
(“[T]he States’ record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-
based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to 
justify the enactment of prophylactic § 5 legislation.”); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370 (2001) (citing the great amount of discrimination outlined in 
legislative findings and pointedly relying on the dearth of evidence of violations specific 
to the right at issue: “Congress assembled . . . minimal evidence of unconstitutional 
state discrimination in employment against the disabled.”) (emphasis added); Kimel v. 
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (emphasizing that Congress lacked findings 
of age discrimination by the states when passing the legislation in question: “Congress 
had virtually no reason to believe that state and local governments were 
unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of age.”). 
 50 While striking down the legislation in question, the Boerne court did 
preserve Congress’ power to enforce broad legislation that “prohibits conduct which is 
not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into ‘legislative spheres of autonomy previously 
reserved to the States.’”  521 U.S. at 530 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 
455 (1976)).  Congress is permitted to enforce “broadly sweeping” legislation under 
certain circumstances, even when it might interfere with traditionally exclusive 
territory of the state.  Id. at 517-18. Proportionality is the key. 
 51 531 U.S. 356 (2001).   
 52 Id. at 365. 
 53 Garrett v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. in Birmingham, 989 F. Supp. 
1409, 1410-12 (N.D. Ala. 1998) (consolidating and granting the state’s motion for 
summary judgment in both cases for claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, 
and the FMLA).  The Eleventh Circuit reversed summary judgment as to the ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act, but affirmed immunity as to the claim brought pursuant to the 
FMLA.  Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 193 F.3d 1214, 1216 (11th 
Cir. 1999).  The ADA claims seeking money damages in suit against the state were the 
only claims in front of the United States Supreme Court.  Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 
(2001).  
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employees of state agencies who claimed protection under Title 
I of the ADA and brought suit against the state of Alabama for 
discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.54   
The Garrett Court briefly acknowledged the ADA’s 
express intent to abrogate55 and then moved to “identify with 
some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue.”56  
Because the Garrett Court was dealing with claims of 
employment discrimination, the Court determined the scope of 
the constitutional right at issue by discussing whether 
disability is a suspect classification for equal protection 
purposes.57  Citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center58 
with approval, the Court repeated that disability is not a 
suspect classification and that such classification by the state 
warrants only rational basis review.59  Emphasizing that the 
House and Committee Reports repeatedly mention 
“employment in the private sector”60 and that state 
discrimination in employment is not mentioned in the Act’s 
  
 54 Patricia Garrett took leave from her work as a Director of Nursing for the 
University of Alabama hospital to undergo treatment for breast cancer and was denied 
her director position upon return.  Garrett, 531 U.S. at 362.  Milton Ash requested 
modification of his employment environment and hours due to asthma and sleep apnea 
upon a doctor’s recommendation, was denied those requests, and reported low work 
evaluations he attributed to the requests.  Id.  
 55 Id. at 364.   
 56 Id. at 365. 
 57 Id. 
 58 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (striking down the application of a city ordinance using 
only rational basis review because state action classifying people with disabilities is not 
considered suspect).  Ruth Colker argues that Cleburne was decided on the premise 
that Congress was actively seeking to redress disability discrimination and applying 
heightened scrutiny would inhibit Congressional affirmative action to remedy 
unconstitutional behavior:   
It turns City of Cleburne on its head to say that the majority chose rational 
basis scrutiny because it wanted to restrict the power of Congress to impose 
affirmative obligations on the states to benefit individuals with 
disabilities . . . .  The majority . . . chose rational basis scrutiny because it had 
confidence that federal and state governments were seeking to create 
affirmative rights for individuals with disabilities.  
Colker, supra note 23, at 692. 
 59 The Court said that “States are not required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled [and that if] special 
accommodations for the disabled are to be required, they have to come from positive 
law and not through the Equal Protection Clause.” Garrett, 531 U.S. 367-68.  For an 
argument that this language is misleading, especially in light of Garrett’s disparate 
treatment grievance that lacked any request for “special” (the Court’s language) or 
even “reasonable” (the ADA’s language) accommodations, see Anita Silvers & Michael 
Ashley Stein, From Plessy (1896) and Goesart (1948) to Cleburne (1985) and Garrett 
(2001): A Chill Wind from the Past Blows Equal Protection Away, in BACKLASH 
AGAINST THE ADA 221, 240-4 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003). 
 60 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371 (quoting S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989)). 
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legislative findings, the Court dismissed the argument that 
there was evidence in the legislative record to support findings 
of unconstitutional employment discrimination in public 
employment.61  Evidence of discrimination in private 
employment did not support Title I’s purported enforcement of 
constitutional guarantees in public employment.  Unconvinced 
by more general evidence of state discrimination against people 
with disabilities in other areas covered by the ADA, the Court 
concluded that Title I does not validly abrogate sovereign 
immunity to allow private suits against state employers.62  
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that without evidence of a 
pattern of discrimination and targeted congruent and 
proportional legislation, “the Act’s application to the States 
would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment 
law laid down by this Court in Cleburne”63 amounting to a 
substantive rather than remedial use of section 5 power.  
Although this holding only explicitly prohibited the 
application of Title I to states, it supported the high bar that 
the Court would apply to future claims of abrogation of state 
sovereign immunity under other Titles of the ADA.64  The 
question became whether a private suit against the state under 
any Title of the ADA could be separated from the holding on 
Title I in Garrett and deemed consistent with, and not 
impermissibly expansive of, extant substantive guarantees of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.   
D. Interpreting Garrett: Popovich v. Cuyahoga County65  
The Lane Court was not the first to attempt to apply 
Garrett’s analysis to Title II of the ADA.  Garrett is vulnerable 
to at least two distinct interpretations that the Lane Court 
recognized even though it declined to definitively adopt one to 
the exclusion of the other.66  Popovich v. Cuyahoga County,67 
  
 61 Id. at 372. 
 62 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, however, that recourse under Title I still 
applies to private employers, that the federal government may sue states for money 
damages, and that individuals may still seek injunctive relief against the state under 
Title I.  Id. at 374 n.9. 
 63 Id.   
 64 Id.  
 65 Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, Popovich v. Cuyahoga County, 537 U.S. 812 (2002). 
 66 This Note argues that in using the fundamental rights tack, the Lane 
Court does not deem the equal protection route invalid.  See infra Part IV. 
 67 Popovich, 276 F.3d 808. 
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more specifically the majority and concurrence therein, outline 
the tension that exists between these possible interpretations 
of Garrett.  The Popovich opinions discussed whether Title II 
may validly abrogate sovereign immunity, pursuant to the 
section 5 power, to enforce both the due process and equal 
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.68  This 
case is important for the purposes of this Note for three 
reasons: the Lane Court discussed the Popovich decision and 
the concurrence without approving either strict approach,69 the 
Court denied certiorari on Popovich upon the state’s appeal, 
and the case also dealt with Title II and disability 
discrimination related to access to courts.  Additionally, the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Popovich influenced the remand by 
the Sixth Circuit in Lane,70 which the Supreme Court affirmed.  
This discussion is essential here because disability 
discrimination in education, the specific issue in McNulty and 
Association for Disabled Americans, deals with a challenge to 
irrational disability discrimination, implicating Title II’s 
enforcement of the equal protection rather than due process 
guarantee.  The concurrence in Popovich is an especially useful 
guide for determining how a court should deal with examining 
whether Title II is an appropriate enforcement of the equal 
protection guarantee. 
In Popovich an individual with a hearing impairment 
brought suit under Title II of the ADA due to the State’s failure 
to provide adequate hearing assistance in his child custody 
case that would have afforded him meaningful access to court.71  
The majority opinion read Garrett as excluding the possibility 
that Title I validly abrogates sovereign immunity when 
addressing equal protection violations.72  Popovich stated 
  
 68 Id. at 810-11. 
 69 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 514-15 (2004). 
 70 Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 71 Popovich, 276 F.3d at 811.  Indeed, the facts of Popovich implicate not only 
the fundamental right of access to courts, but also the “special nature of parental 
rights” that is “sufficiently fundamental to come within the finite class of liberty 
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 813-14 (citing Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 774 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). 
 72 Id. at 812.  The court noted this exclusion’s basis in Garrett: 
The [Garrett] Court, noting that the Title I legislation is limited to 
employment discrimination against the disabled, said that “the scope of the 
constitutional right at issue” is simply “equal protection” . . . . The Court then 
held that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not give Congress the 
power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause by authorizing federal 
employment discrimination suits against states based purely on disability.  
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conclusively that “congressional authority under section 5 to 
enforce the Equal Protection Clause is limited and will not 
sustain the Disabilities Act as an exception to Eleventh 
Amendment state immunity.”73  Popovich also expressed a 
willingness to extend Garrett’s reasoning to all Titles of the 
ADA, acknowledging that there is only a small possibility that 
the Supreme Court may distinguish Garrett in future cases 
involving the other Titles.74    
The Popovich court did, however, remand because it 
deemed  Title II’s abrogation of sovereign immunity an 
appropriate section 5 enforcement of the Due Process Clause.75  
The Popovich court emphasized that a major distinction 
between Titles I and II is the type of claims the Titles cover, 
with the latter “encompass[ing] various due process-type 
claims with varying standards of liability . . . not limited to 
equal protection claims.”76  Considering the nature of the 
fundamental rights involved in meaningful access to child 
custody hearings, Popovich held that Congress was within its 
power to legislate immunity abrogation and by doing so was 
“enforcing” rather than “expanding” the due process 
guarantee.77  The majority failed to explain, however, why 
Congress cannot “enforce” rather than “expand” the Equal 
Protection Clause’s guarantee against irrational disability 
discrimination.  Whether Congress sought to enforce the 
prohibition on irrational disability discrimination or sought to 
  
Id.  The court specified that abrogation is invalid as an enforcement of the Equal 
Protection Clause in other contexts, clearly stemming from this  interpretation of 
Garrett: 
We reverse and remand the case for a new trial because the charge to the 
jury appears to permit the jury to find in favor of the plaintiff if it finds 
discrimination against him or exclusion from public proceedings based on 
equal protection principles.  After Garrett, this is an impermissible basis on 
which to base federal jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment or a 
verdict and damages against a state court under the Disabilities Act.  
Id. at 816. 
 73 Id. at 812. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 813. 
 76 Popovich, 276 F.3d at 813.  Lane uses very similar language to describe the 
coverage of Title II, noting that  
Title II, like Title I, seeks to enforce this prohibition on irrational disability 
discrimination.  But it also seeks to enforce a variety of other basic 
constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more 
searching judicial review.  These rights include some, like the right of access 
to the courts at issue in this case, that are protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522-23 (2004) (internal citations omitted). 
 77 Popovich, 276 F.3d at 815. 
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enforce the due process guarantee served as the Popovich 
court’s key to assessing the validity of the ADA’s abrogation of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.78  Popovich does not even 
address Garrett’s lengthy discussion of the legislative history of 
Title I and the distinction Garrett makes between evidence of 
violations supporting Title I and evidence of violations 
supporting Titles II or III.   
Judge Moore’s concurring opinion in Popovich specified 
this shortcoming in the court’s opinion.  The Popovich 
concurrence refused to foreclose the possibility that Title II’s 
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity could be a valid 
enforcement of the equal protection guarantee particularly 
because  that question was not even before the court.79  While 
the majority seemed to forego the application of any type of 
standard to state action under the constitutional guarantee of 
equal protection, highlighting that “the scope of the 
constitutional right at issue [was] simply equal protection,”80 
the concurrence reminded the court that the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits “arbitrary and invidious discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities [and that] ‘the [disabled], 
like others, have and retain their substantive constitutional 
rights in addition to the right to be treated equally by the 
law.’”81  Agreeing that when the scope of the right does not 
extend further than that afforded by the guarantee to be 
treated equally by the law (when there is a nonfundamental 
right involved) Congress cannot impose more than equal 
protection liability,82 the concurrence asserted that this liability 
nonetheless mandates that states act rationally.83  This was not 
an issue in Garrett because no history of irrational disability 
discrimination in public employment had been identified, not 
  
 78 Popovich also discussed the separation of powers problem at length, citing 
the boundaries of Congress’ section 5 enforcement power to prohibit a “‘broader swath 
of conduct’ than the courts have themselves identified as unconstitutional.”  Id. at 813 
(quoting Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001)). 
 79 Id. at 818 (Moore, J., concurring). 
 80 Id. at 812 (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 963) (emphasis added, internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The court continues, “Title I does not encompass claims 
based on substantive rights under the Due Process Clause, and therefore the scope of 
the constitutional right Congress is enforcing does not go beyond equal protection 
liability.” Id. 
 81 Id. at 818 (Moore, J., concurring) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985)) (emphasis added). 
 82 Popovich, 276 F.3d at 812. 
 83 Id. at 818 (Moore, J., concurring). 
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because Congress was powerless to remedy equal protection 
violations had they occurred therein.  
Judge Moore specifically referenced Garrett’s focus on 
Congress’ failure to identify a history and pattern of 
unconstitutional discrimination in public employment and the 
resulting reluctance to accept enforcement of Title I against the 
states.84 In doing so, Judge Moore underscored that Garrett’s 
review of the legislative history of Title I cannot also be 
considered a review of the legislative history of Title II.  Judge 
Moore felt that a Title II claim requires review of documented 
constitutional violations in relation to the specific claim being 
brought in order to determine the validity of section 5 
enforcement power regarding immunity abrogation.  Judge 
Moore asserted that the enforcement clause can validly remedy 
either due process or equal protection violations.85  Moreover, 
the concurrence cited the legislative history and evidence 
before Congress that supported Title II, noting the distinction 
from the lack of history in Garrett.  Quoting the majority’s 
declaration that the right involved here “sounds more clearly 
not in equal protection but in due process,”86 the concurrence 
pointed out that the evidence of “states’ discrimination against 
the disabled in areas such as voting and education[] clearly 
implicates the Equal Protection Clause.”87  Judge Moore did not 
see reason to foreclose the application of Title II against the 
states for the violation of the Constitution’s equal protection 
guarantee, especially when the question of a nonfundamental 
right was not before the court.   
  
 84 Id.  Judge Moore was unequivocal in her assertion that Garrett’s finding on 
Title I does not control abrogation findings under the other Titles of the Act.  Id. 
 85 Id.  Consider also that Lane’s as applied approach more closely resembled 
Judge Moore’s inclination to assess Title II on its own merits, in review of its own 
legislative history.  This supports the argument that Lane does not adopt the Popovich 
majority’s approach that propounds validity of abrogation only in protection of 
substantive due process rights. 
 86 Id. at 820 (Moore, J., concurring).   
 87 Popovich, 276 F.3d at 820.  Judge Moore’s language here presents an 
interesting comparison to the Justice Stevens authored majority opinion in Lane:  
Whatever might be said about Title II’s other applications, the question 
presented in this case is not whether Congress can validly subject the States 
to private suits for money damages for failing to provide reasonable access to 
hockey rinks, or even to voting booths, but whether Congress had the power 
under § 5 to enforce the constitutional right of access to the courts.  
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530-31 (2004).  Justice Stevens framed this to 
compare access to courts to other rights one may claim along Title II’s spectrum of 
protection; Moore uses similar language to discuss when Title II may validly be used to 
enforce equal protection by mentioning voting and education. 
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Finally, in demonstrating the congruence and 
proportionality of the section 5 power used in Title II to enforce 
equal protection rather than due process, Judge Moore pointed 
out that in order to take  
some affirmative steps to ensure that the disabled have access to 
governmental programs, [Title II] targets discrimination that is 
unreasonable.  Title II requires reasonable modifications only when 
a disabled individual is otherwise eligible for a public service and the 
modifications would not fundamentally alter the nature of the 
service.  The states therefore maintain their discretion over the 
provision of public services so long as they do not arbitrarily 
discriminate against the disabled.88 
These named internal limitations, in combination with 
the record behind Title II, convinced Judge Moore that “Title II 
is a more congruent and proportional remedy than Title I.”89   
The Lane Court’s refusal to definitively resolve the 
Popovich tension, even after the Sixth Circuit applied Popovich 
to Lane, strongly implies that the Court intended to hold the 
door open to nonfundamental rights claims under Title II.  
Much of Judge Moore’s reasoning is echoed in Lane – from the 
parsing of the ADA into an “as applied”90 approach to the 
thorough review of the legislative history behind each 
purported protection.  Additionally, Judge Moore’s mentioning 
of voting and education may be said to have influenced Stevens’ 
idea of the spectrum of possible claims ranging from hockey 
rinks to voting booths.  In naming these extremes, Justice 
Stevens likely countenanced claims that would implicate 
fundamental rights and nonfundamental rights associated with 
equal protection, ranging in importance from education to 
access to hockey rinks.  Lane mentioned this Popovich tension 
but did not resolve it because only the due process guarantee 
was at issue on the facts of the case.  However, cases that deal 
exclusively with the equal protection guarantee, like McNulty 
  
 88 Popovich, 276 F.3d at 820 (Moore, J., concurring) (emphasis added). See 
also Ass’n for Disabled Ams. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 405 F.3d 954, 959 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(emphasizing similarly that states maintain discretion over the provision of public 
services and that the ADA only calls for reasonable accommodations, barring only 
irrational discrimination). 
 89 Popovich, 276 F.3d at 820 (Moore, J., concurring); cf. Bd. of Trs. of the 
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370-73 (2001) (rejecting the congruence and 
proportionality of Title I, even assuming “it [were] possible to squeeze out of these 
examples a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination”). 
 90 Lane, 541 U.S. at 551 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  For ease of 
discussion, this Note accepts Chief Justice Rehnquist’s labeling of the Court’s analysis 
as the “as applied” approach and will refer to it as such throughout the discussion. 
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and Association for Disabled Americans, should engage in this 
prescribed inquiry. 
E. The Post-Lane Standard 
1. The Facts of Lane 
George Lane and Beverly Jones brought a private suit 
against the state of Tennessee seeking damages and equitable 
relief.91  Due to paraplegia, both Lane and Jones were unable to 
access certain court facilities and services in county 
courthouses.92  Lane was required to attend court for criminal 
proceedings93 and Jones needed to access court for her work as 
a certified court reporter.94  Neither plaintiff found the county 
courthouses to be wheelchair accessible.95  The U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that Title II validly 
abrogates Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for the 
due process claim involving access to courts.96   
The U.S. Supreme Court’s acknowledgment of the 
fundamental nature of the right at stake was important in this 
holding, but the Court did not foreclose the possibility of valid 
abrogation when a fundamental right is not at stake and when 
only equal protection violations are identified.  Additionally, 
the position of certain rights on the spectrum between a hockey 
rink and a voting booth97 may also impact the abrogation 
analysis. 
  
 91 Id. at 513-14. 
 92 Id. at 513. 
 93 Id. In the Lane analysis, the nature of Lane’s compulsion to appear in 
court is significant to the identification of a fundamental right, as the court cites the 
“variety” of constitutional guarantees Title II seeks to enforce including the Due 
Process Clause and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at 522-23.   
 94 Id. at 514. 
 95 Lane, 541 U.S. at 514.  Lane, in fact, had crawled up the stairs to attend 
his first appearance and at the second hearing he refused to crawl or be carried up the 
stairs.  Id.  
 96 In fact, the Sixth Circuit remanded, Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680, 682 
(6th Cir. 2003), and the Supreme Court affirmed remand for further proceedings on the 
factual record after finding abrogation valid in the context of this due process claim.  
Tennessee argued that due process rights were not at stake and the claimants 
disagreed.  Lane, 541 U.S. at 515.   
 97 See infra Part IV (arguing that equal protection violations warrant 
exercise of section 5 power abrogating sovereign immunity and that education holds a 
special place on the Court’s conceptualized spectrum). 
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2. Scope of the Right/Identification of a Fundamental 
Right 
The Lane Court cited precedent, including Garrett, at 
length but also discussed the prior Sixth Circuit case, Popovich, 
involving Title II and access to courts.  The Popovich98 majority 
drew a clear distinction between due process and equal 
protection violations and the justifiable exercise of the section 5 
power for abrogation in enforcement of the ADA’s Title II.99  
The Lane Court cited this distinction made by Popovich, but 
did not explicitly adopt it.  Instead, the Court left open the 
question as to Title II’s remedies dealing with equal protection 
violations not necessarily implicating fundamental rights.  
Importantly, the Lane Court also did not adopt the same 
distinction the Sixth Circuit made in Lane to accord with the 
Circuit’s holding in Popovich – that Title II may validly 
abrogate sovereign immunity to remedy due process violations 
but not equal protection violations.  The Lane Court continued 
with the standard abrogation analysis rather than base its 
decision on the due process-equal protection divide.100 
  
 98 See supra Part III.D. 
 99 276 F.3d 808, 811 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
 100 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 515-17.  Interestingly, much of the Sixth Circuit’s 
language in Lane lauded the remedy of Title II to constitutional violations identified in 
the legislative history as congruent and proportional.  Indeed, much of this praise can 
support an argument for finding Title II abrogation valid in a wider range of 
constitutional violations than for infringement of the fundamental right of access to 
courts.  The Sixth Circuit discussed this at length: 
Title II ensures that the refusal to accommodate an individual with a 
disability is genuinely based on unreasonable cost or actual inability to 
accommodate, not on inconvenience or unfounded concerns about costs.  This 
statutory protection is a preventive measure commensurate to the gravity of 
precluding access to the courts by those with disabilities.  In addition, these 
requirements are carefully tailored to the unique features of disability 
discrimination that persists in public services.  A simple ban on 
discrimination against those with disabilities lacks teeth.  The continuing 
legacy of discrimination is too powerful.  Title II affirmatively promotes 
integration of those with disabilities.  
Lane, 315 F.3d at 683.  One may argue that the acknowledgment of this recognized 
history of disability discrimination in public services, and the recognition that section 5 
enforcement needs “teeth” in light of this history, militates against denying equal 
protection guarantees the same force of protection.  If there were not any affirmative 
enforcement mechanisms for remedying equal protection violations, irrational 
disability discrimination would also persist.  See also David R. Fine, Court Left Issues 
Open, NAT’L L.J. 23, June 7, 2004, at 23, as cited in McNulty, for a brief discussion of 
the Court’s possible motivation for alluding to this divide but not ascribing to it.  Fine 
feels that the Court may have rejected it if not for the need to bring in Justice 
O’Connor.  Id. 
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Lane discussed both the nature of the right at issue and 
the historical discrimination outlined in the legislative record, 
thus adhering to the well-established standard of determining 
whether sovereign immunity has been validly abrogated.  The 
Lane Court applied the standard Boerne proportionality test; 
Lane’s further identification of a fundamental right necessarily 
weighed into this proportionality test, perhaps mostly because 
the specific right at stake based upon those facts “sound[ed] 
most clearly not in equal protection but in due process.”101  
However, Lane’s holding did not deem the identification of a 
fundamental right essential to finding the ADA’s abrogation 
provision valid in all circumstances.   
After confirming that the ADA expressly intends to 
abrogate sovereign immunity,102 the Lane Court began the 
Boerne analysis by identifying the scope of the right at issue.103  
In Lane,  
the task of identifying the scope of the relevant constitutional 
protection [was] more difficult [than in Garrett] because Title II 
purports to enforce a panoply of constitutional rights of disabled 
persons: not only the equal protection right against irrational 
discrimination, but also certain rights protected by the Due Process 
Clause.104   
This broad coverage, however, does not mandate the 
finding that Title II is overbroad, does not require that each 
Title II protection be scrutinized at once, and does not declare 
that Title II protections must rest entirely on the identification 
of a fundamental right under the due process clause.105  
Instead, this coverage demonstrates Congress’ identification of 
constitutional violations that impact both fundamental and 
nonfundamental rights, including the right to be treated 
equally under the law.   
  
 101 Popovich, 276 F.3d at 820.  See supra note 86. 
 102 Lane, 541 U.S. at 518. 
 103 Id. at 522.  First, the Court reiterated Garrett’s articulation of  “the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s command that ‘all persons similarly situated should be 
treated alike’” and emphasized that Title II “also seeks to enforce a variety of other 
basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more searching 
judicial review.”  Id. at 522-23 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 
U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). 
 104 Id. at 540 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).   
 105 Id. at 522-23.  The Court lists all of the constitutional rights involving 
some kind of access to courts protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, including rights guaranteed by the First and Sixth Amendments.  Id. at 
523. 
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The prohibition on unconstitutional irrational disability 
discrimination remains intact as a crucial determinant for the 
validity of prophylactic legislation where there is no 
fundamental right implicated.  The Court’s identification of the 
importance of access to courts motivated it to find in favor of 
abrogation by citing history of discrimination in public services 
and accommodations generally, rather than limiting its review 
of evidence to infringements on access to courts.106  The 
identification of a fundamental right in Lane did not entirely 
control the finding of valid abrogation.   
For the purpose of illustration, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s observation in Nevada Department of Human 
Resources v. Hibbs107 is useful:  the heightened scrutiny 
triggered by suspect classifications makes it “easier for 
Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations.”108  
Constitutional violations in fundamental rights areas are 
perhaps more easily proven because state action is subject to 
heightened scrutiny, but that does not mean that it is 
impossible to demonstrate a history of violations in 
nonfundamental rights areas that may nonetheless require 
prophylactic measures triggering the protections of the Equal 
Protection Clause.  In fact, the Lane Court explicitly 
acknowledged that “[w]hen Congress seeks to remedy or 
prevent unconstitutional discrimination, § 5 authorizes it to 
enact prophylactic legislation proscribing practices that are 
discriminatory in effect, if not in intent, to carry out the basic 
objectives of the Equal Protection Clause.”109 
The prohibition on irrational disability discrimination is 
most definitely a “basic objective” of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  This is true even though Lane’s identification of the 
right at stake as the fundamental one of access to courts led 
the Court to its final approach to dealing with the ADA’s 
purported abrogation – the as applied approach to determining 
the validity of the ADA’s abrogation of sovereign immunity. 
The Lane Court’s as applied analysis means that the 
Supreme Court found “nothing in [its] case law [that required 
  
 106 Id. at 529-31. 
 107 538 U.S. 721 (2003). This case dealt with the Family Medical Leave Act 
“aim[ed] to protect the right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the 
workplace.”  Id. at 728.  The Court found that the Family Medical Leave Act did validly 
abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.  Id. at 740. 
 108 Id. at 736. 
 109 Lane, 541 U.S. at 520 (emphasis added). 
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it] to consider Title II, with its wide variety of applications, as 
an undifferentiated whole.”110  The Court considered congruence 
and proportionality as it applied to the fundamental right of 
access to courts only, in relation to the documented history of 
unconstitutional violations both in public services generally 
and in the administration of justice specifically.111  The Lane 
majority rejected the dissent’s contention that prior case law 
mandated it had to examine Title II and all the protections 
outlined therein to validate abrogation in this context.112  The 
Lane majority countered that Garrett in particular supports 
this as applied approach because Garrett both determined the 
validity of abrogation as to the “enforcement of a single 
constitutional right”113 and only as to Title I of the ADA.  The 
Court was content to keep its holding narrow, concluding: 
Whatever might be said about Title II’s other applications, the 
question presented in this case is not whether Congress can validly 
subject the states to private suits for money damages for failing to 
provide reasonable access to hockey rinks, or even to voting booths, 
but whether Congress had the power under § 5 to enforce the 
constitutional right of access to the courts.114 
The explicit limits of this as applied approach should 
not invalidate abrogation under Title II addressing in all 
instances that do not implicate a fundamental right.  To 
appropriately apply Lane in other contexts, it is necessary to 
understand the analysis that follows the Court’s outlining of 
the metes and bounds of the specific right at stake.  In line 
with the congruence and proportionality test, and in a similar 
manner to the Garrett Court, the Lane Court thoroughly 
discussed the legislative history behind enactment of Title II 
and its purported remedies. 
3. The Court’s Use of the Legislative History 
The ADA’s legislative history supports the proposition 
that the ADA validly abrogates sovereign immunity in varying 
Title II contexts.  Whether the object of legislation is remedying 
violations of a fundamental right, as in Lane, or a 
  
 110 Id. at 530. 
 111 Id. at 531.  
 112 Id. at 530 n.18. See also id. at 534 (Souter, J., concurring) (suggesting that 
even Rehnquist’s more “expansive enquiry” would have the same result). 
 113 Id. at 531 n.18 (emphasis added). 
 114 Lane, 541 U.S. at 530-31. 
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nonfundamental right, as in Garrett, the Court engages in the 
examination of the legislative record.  Therefore, this analysis 
may again be understood through comparison with Garrett and 
through use of the Lane Court’s own distinguishing from 
Garrett. 
Distinction from Garrett has at least two components in 
the Lane analysis: nonfundamental as opposed to fundamental 
right identification and comparison of legislative histories 
evidencing state constitutional violations in Title I as opposed 
to Title II.  The legislative history of Title I cited in Garrett did 
not support legislative congruence and proportionality because 
the constitutional violations demonstrated in the record related 
primarily to private, not public, employment.  Put simply, this 
legislative history of private discrimination could not have 
supported congruence and proportionality considering the 
ADA’s requirements of the state, a public entity.115  The Lane 
Court remembered 
that the ‘overwhelming majority’ of [the] evidence [in Garrett] 
related to ‘the provision of public services and public 
accommodations, which areas are addressed in Titles II and III,’ 
rather than Title I [and] that neither the ADA’s legislative findings 
nor its legislative history reflected a concern that the States had 
been engaging in a pattern of unconstitutional employment 
discrimination.116   
The Garrett Court engaged in the standard right 
identification process that Lane followed.117  Garrett defined the 
right alleged to be violated, the guarantee of equal protection in 
the employment context,118 and discussed the decisive dearth of 
legislative history outlining violations.119 
  
 115 But see id. at 551-52. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  In his dissent, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist stated that there was little evidence of discrimination by the states 
at all in the legislative record.  Id.  Seemingly to the contrary, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s argument in Garrett regarding legislative history could be construed to 
mean that the evidence of discrimination by the state in public services was indeed 
present and strong.  See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 371-72 
& n.7 (2001). 
 116 Lane, 541 U.S. at 521-22 (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371 n.7) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 117 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365. 
 118 Id. (“[W]e look to our prior decisions under the Equal Protection Clause 
dealing with the issue.”) 
 119 The Garrett Court was looking at the legislative record of Title I 
specifically.  Id. at 368-74.  Lane followed this pattern, unchanged in this particular 
sense by the involvement of a fundamental right.  Lane, 541 U.S. at 523-24. 
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Once the constitutional rights at stake were iterated, 
the Lane Court proceeded with the traditional and influential 
examination of legislative history that is entirely in line with 
Garrett and other precedent.120  The Court’s mention of a “more 
searching judicial review”121 required in the context of 
fundamental rights did not eclipse its acknowledgment that 
Title II also seeks to prohibit “irrational disability 
discrimination . . . .”122  Title II’s duty to accommodate may well 
meet the congruence and proportionality standard in other 
contexts given the great extent of legislative history involving 
other constitutional violations, absent the implication of a 
fundamental right.123  
The Lane Court explained why the ADA’s legislative 
history legitimizes Title II abrogation of sovereign immunity in 
reference to access to courts where Title I did not in reference 
to private employment in Garrett.124  The Garrett Court was not 
  
 120 Lane, 541 U.S. at 523.  The Court states that “[w]hether Title II validly 
enforces these constitutional rights is a question that ‘must be judged with reference to 
the historical experience which it reflects.’” Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)). 
 121 Id. at 522-23. 
 122 Id. at 522. See also Brief for Paralyzed Veterans of America et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Appellants, Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (No. 02-1667), 
2003 WL 22721614, at *5. (“Congress’ findings explicitly and unambiguously 
encompass discrimination in public areas that are largely or entirely within the 
purview of the States, as well as multiple areas that indisputably include State 
conduct.  Congress also specifically found that the discrimination at issue was 
irrational, noting a ‘history of purposeful unequal treatment . . . resulting from stereo-
typic assumptions.’”) (citations omitted). This brief also outlines “Patterns of 
Unconstitutional State Discrimination in Education.” Id. at *19-21.   
 123 “Because this implicates the right of access to the courts, we need not 
consider whether Title II’s duty to accommodate exceeds what the Constitution 
requires in classes of cases that implicate only Cleburne’s prohibition on irrational 
discrimination.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 532 n.20. 
 124 The Garrett Court’s holding that “Congress did not validly abrogate the 
states’ sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under 
Title I[,]” 531 U.S. at 374 n.9, left open the question as to Title II, especially after the 
Garrett Court repeated that there was evidence present addressing discrimination in 
the public sector, covered by Titles II and III.  Id. at 369-71, 371 n.7.  Garrett also 
suggested that not only does Title I not validly abrogate sovereign immunity, but that 
perhaps Congress never meant it to in the context of public employment as opposed to 
in the other contexts for which there is a massive amount of evidence of disability 
discrimination in the legislative history: “[T]here is . . . strong evidence that Congress’ 
failure to mention States in its legislative findings addressing discrimination in 
employment reflects that body’s judgment that no pattern of unconstitutional state 
action has been documented.”  Id. at 372.  This indicates that the Garrett opinion is not 
only based on the Court’s finding that the legislation is entirely incongruent to any 
constitutional violation it seeks to remedy, but also based upon the Court’s impression 
that public employment was not a context in which Congress determined people needed 
protection under the ADA.  See also LEWIS, supra note 28, at §5.35, at 440 n.42 (“A 
negative pregnant in Garrett suggests that the Court might incline more favorably 
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convinced by legislative history and task force reports 
indicating Congress’ recognition of a history of pervasive 
employment discrimination in the public sector partly due to 
the lack of any such specific instances being mentioned in the 
Act’s legislative findings themselves.125  The Act’s findings cited 
by the Garrett Court do, however, mention public services as 
“critical areas” in which “discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities persists . . . .”126  This language supports the 
Garrett Court’s seeming concession that there is significant 
evidence of discrimination in the public sector, specifically in 
public services and accommodations that are covered in ADA 
Titles II and III.  This evidence was persuasive enough for 
Congress to include it in the Act itself, indicating that Congress 
found the findings amounted to a history of pervasive 
unconstitutional state action that it was aiming to remedy.   
Another aspect of comparison in the legislative histories 
discussed in Garrett and Lane relates to the type of legislative 
histories the Court uses or rejects in the two cases.  One of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s major concerns, in both the Garrett 
decision and the Lane dissent, was the use of anecdotal and 
broad evidence to analyze the validity of abrogation as part of 
legislative congruence and proportionality aimed to enforce a 
specific constitutional guarantee.127  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
insisted that the Lane Court used evidence rejected by the 
Garrett Court, evidence that cannot possibly demonstrate a 
history of pervasive state discrimination in either the public 
employment or the access to court areas.128  It is not surprising 
  
towards effective Congressional abrogation of the states’ immunity from actions under 
ADA Titles II and III.  The Court notes that the legislative record and resulting 
findings in Senate and House reports were deficient respecting a history of state 
employment (i.e., Title I) discrimination against the disabled, specifically 
distinguishing the more ample record and findings about public services and 
accommodations.”).  
 125 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370-71. 
 126 42 U.S.C. §12101(3) (2000). The legislative findings here also mention 
‘education’ as discussed infra Part IV.  Notably, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in 
Lane reiterated this point.  It stated that because access to courts was not mentioned in 
the legislative findings, similar to the silence on public employment, Congress did not 
“truly under[stand the] [task force] information as reflecting a pattern of 
unconstitutional behavior by the States.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 546 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 127 Lane, 541 U.S. at 542-43 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 128 Id. at 541 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
Rather than limiting its discussion of constitutional violations to the due 
process rights on which it ultimately relies, the majority sets out on a wide-
ranging account of societal discrimination against the disabled.  This 
digression recounts historical discrimination against the disabled through 
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that the Lane majority found Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
objections in this regard “puzzling.”129  The distinctions the 
Garrett Court made were categorical; the Court primarily 
distinguished public employment from  private employment, 
specific to  equal protection in employment.  In contrast, the 
voluminous record of discrimination in public services that 
Lane detailed includes examples of discrimination in access to 
courts, and the Court took access to courts to be a part of Title 
II’s public services.  Instead of making categorical 
comparisons130 like the Garrett Court, the Lane Court dealt 
with one category, public services, and the subcategory of 
access to courts.131   
The Lane Court left open the possibility that Title II, 
unlike Title I, would survive abrogation analysis without the 
identification of a fundamental right.  The Court’s severing of 
Title II from the rest of the ADA and examination of Title II as 
it applied only to the guarantee of access to courts left future 
decisions regarding abrogation under Title II in different public 
service contexts open to separate analyses.   
  
institutionalization laws, restrictions on marriage, voting, and public 
education, conditions in mental hospitals, and various other forms of unequal 
treatment in the administration of public programs and services.  Some of 
this evidence would be relevant if the Court were considering the 
constitutionality of the statute as a whole; but the Court rejects that 
approach in favor of a narrower “as applied” inquiry.  We discounted much 
the same type of outdated, generalized evidence in Garrett as unsupportive of 
Title I’s ban on employment discrimination.   
Id. at 541-42 (internal citations omitted). Chief Justice Rehnquist is highly critical of 
this approach, even though it may be argued that it is quite in line with his Garrett 
parsing of the ADA.   
 129 Id. at 528. 
 130 The categories posited opposite one another in Garrett are ‘public’ and 
‘private’ employment.  This is the most influential distinction in the record that Garrett 
examines, leading it to conclude that public employment was not contemplated by the 
Title I protections – there was no evidence that Title I targeted discrimination in public 
employment.  Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370-71. 
 131 The Lane Court also declared that the Congressional record bolstering the 
ADA was even stronger than that examined in Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 
U.S. 721 (2003), where the Court definitively found congruence and proportionality of 
prophylactic legislation enacted pursuant to section 5 based on Congressional findings 
of the same kind: “[T]he record of constitutional violations in this case – including 
judicial findings of unconstitutional state action, and statistical, legislative, and 
anecdotal evidence of the widespread exclusion of persons with disabilities from the 
enjoyment of public services – far exceeds the record in Hibbs.”  Lane, 541 U.S. at 529.  
Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s argument in his Lane dissent is similar to 
Justice Kennedy’s dissent from the Rehnquist authored majority in Hibbs.  See Hibbs, 
538 U.S. at 746-48. 
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IV. TITLE II AND THE ABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
IN THE EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT 
This section uses Lane’s as applied analysis to examine 
claims brought in the education context under Title II.  Lane’s 
narrow holding does not foreclose private suits for equitable 
relief and money damages in public service contexts that do not 
implicate fundamental rights; instead, the decision encourages 
analysis of each specific case of discrimination in the various 
public service contexts contemplated by Title II.  Because 
public education is unique among services offered by the 
government, it deserves special consideration in the abrogation 
analysis.  Thus, ADA Title II claims brought in the public 
education context evince a greater likelihood of valid 
abrogation, which is supported by the legislative history of the 
ADA Title II.  Lane’s language, including the reference to 
accessing anything from “hockey rinks [to] voting booths,”132 
demonstrates that the Court expects a wide range of rights 
asserted between these two extremes.  Decisions along the 
spectrum will depend largely on the congressional record of 
recent and significant constitutional violations in public 
services to determine the congruence and proportionality of the 
legislation. 
Given the relative lack of case law analyzing the 
validity of Title II specifically, Lane impacts the way courts 
should look at Title II, with and without the fundamental 
rights piece of the analysis.  Two recent cases, McNulty v. 
Board of Education of Calvert County133 and Association for 
Disabled Americans v. Florida International University,134 
consider the Title II context of public education that does not 
trigger the fundamental rights analysis.  Both cases rely on 
Lane and reach opposite results.  The remainder of this Note 
will focus on the potential for abrogation in the context of 
public education, explaining how the District Court of 
Maryland misconstrued the Lane precedent and supplementing 
  
 132 “Whatever might be said about Title II’s other applications, the question 
presented in this case is not whether Congress can validly subject the States to private 
suits for money damages for failing to provide reasonable access to hockey rinks, or 
even to voting booths, but whether Congress had the power under § 5 to enforce the 
constitutional right of access to courts.  Because we find that Title II unquestionably is 
valid § 5 legislation as it applies to the class of cases implicating the accessibility of 
judicial services, we need go no further.”  Lane, 541 U.S. at 530-31. 
 133 No. Civ. A. DKC 2003-2520, 2004 WL 1554401 (D. Md. July 8, 2004). 
 134 405 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis to offer more concrete 
guidelines for future courts confronting the issue. 
A. The District Court: McNulty v. Board of Education of 
Calvert County135 
When Ryan McNulty was in the ninth grade, he was 
subjected to several disciplinary measures and, primarily as a 
disciplinary measure, the vice principal of his public high 
school assigned him to a separate education program that was 
outside of the mainstream of classes.136  This program did not 
offer the same classes as the mainstream track, and Ryan 
completed his tenth grade year at a private school where he 
excelled.137  When he returned to the public high school for the 
eleventh grade, Ryan was subject to several more disciplinary 
measures that he felt were inflicted unfairly, including at least 
two suspensions.138  Ryan McNulty’s diagnosed disability was 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).139  
Administrators did not consider his conduct to be a 
manifestation of his disability.140 
After Ryan was told he would not be promoted due to 
his absences even though he passed all of his classes, his 
parents objected and the school eventually agreed to promote 
him.141  Ryan graduated from the school in June 2002.142  
McNulty alleged that a series of disciplinary referrals, failure 
to adhere to a section 504 education plan, and retaliation 
against parents by the school143 representatives all made out 
violations of Title II’s provision that “no qualified individual 
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded 
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
  
 135 2004 WL 1554401. 
 136 McNulty, 2004 WL 155401, at *1.  
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at *2. 
 142 McNulty, 2004 WL 155401, at *2.   
 143 This Note uses the McNulty acknowledgement of the Board of Education as 
a state agency.  Id. at *4.  The Board of Education in this case may be considered an 
arm of the state for the purposes of sovereign immunity analysis.   
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programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity.”144   
The McNulty court dismissed the ADA Title II claim on 
a 12(b)(6) motion without reaching the merits of the claim, 
citing Lane as the basis for dismissal.145  McNulty referred to 
Lane’s as applied method and found that “Eleventh 
Amendment immunity remains intact for education claims 
under Title II of the ADA.”146  Lane did not call for such a result 
in the education context.  The facts in McNulty implicate the 
section 5 enforcement power enacting the ADA as “appropriate 
legislation” to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal 
protection guarantee, rather than the due process guarantee 
discussed in Lane.  In this context, Title II protects individuals 
against irrational disability discrimination in public education.  
The facts do not trigger the fundamental rights portion of the 
Lane analysis, but nonetheless support Title II’s legitimate 
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.147  
The legislative history documenting violations and the 
importance of equality in the provision of educational services 
make out a stronger case for abrogation of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity in education than in other contexts. 
The McNulty court’s rationale was based entirely on 
education not being a fundamental right and disabled persons 
not being members of a suspect class.148  While purporting to be 
based on Lane, this analysis did not implement Lane’s 
methodology.  Instead, the McNulty court substituted one 
question – whether there is a fundamental right at stake – for 
the lengthy and complex section 5 abrogation analysis that 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence, up to and including Lane, 
mandates.  The McNulty court’s approach is more analogous to 
the Sixth Circuit’s decisions in Popovich and Lane, rather than 
to the approach the U.S. Supreme Court set forth  in Lane.  
The Supreme Court did not rely on the due process-equal 
  
 144 Id. at *6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000)).  Although McNulty alleged 
claims under Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 504, and 29 U.S.C. § 794, this Note will only 
discuss whether dismissal of the ADA Title II claim was appropriate.  Id. at *2.  
 145 Id. at *3. 
 146 McNulty, 2004 WL 155401, at *3.  
 147 Abrogation in this context is valid because Congress enacted ADA Title II 
to prevent irrational disability discrimination in the face of recent and significant 
evidence of such discrimination and because the education context warrants special 
consideration.  Preventing irrational disability discrimination is a “basic objective[]” of 
the Equal Protection Clause.  Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520 (2004).  
 148 McNulty, 2004 WL 1554401, at *10-11. 
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protection divide for its holding.  The Court instead 
exhaustively examined the legislative history and the 
congruence and proportionality of Title II’s remedy.  In this 
reliance, the Lane decision directed courts, including the 
district court in McNulty, to look into the specific legislative 
findings in the area of public education, an endeavor that may 
have resulted in denial of the defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion.  In 
heavy reliance on the due process-equal protection divide, 
McNulty briefly mentioned that “state action affecting the 
disabled is subject only to rational basis review”149 but did not 
explain how this would affect the abrogation analysis.  In fact, 
the court did not acknowledge the prohibition on irrational 
disability discrimination as potentially providing any floor for 
state action.   
The absence of a fundamental right does not signify the 
absence of any constitutional guarantee whatsoever; in this 
case, the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against 
irrational disability discrimination should trigger the full 
abrogation analysis for an alleged violation of Title II.  Lane’s 
Title II analysis maintains the validity of the ADA’s legitimate 
goal of prohibiting irrational state discrimination and the 
fundamental right identification is not essential.  As Judge 
Moore and the Lane majority would agree, evidence of “states’ 
discrimination against the disabled in areas such as voting and 
education . . . clearly implicate[s] the Equal Protection 
Clause.”150 
B. The Eleventh Circuit: Association for Disabled 
Americans v. Florida International University151 
The plaintiffs in Association for Disabled Americans 
alleged that FIU violated the ADA Title II by, among other 
things, “failing to provide qualified sign language interpreters, 
failing to provide adequate auxiliary aids and services such as 
effective note takers, and failing to furnish appropriate aids to 
its students with disabilities such as physical access to certain 
programs and facilities at FIU.”152  The plaintiffs alleged that 
these failures constituted the exclusion and denial of public 
  
 149 Id. (quoting Wessel v. Glendening, 306 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
 150 Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, 820 
(6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Moore, J., concurring). 
 151 405 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 152 Id. at 956. 
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services to people with disabilities prohibited by Title II and 
they sought injunctive relief to prevent further violations.153 
The Eleventh Circuit found that “[t]he relief available 
under Title II of the ADA is congruent and proportional to the 
injury and the means adopted to remedy the injury”154 
primarily because “education, though not fundamental, is vital 
to the future success of our society.”155  The court accepted 
Lane’s examination of the legislative history of Title II as a 
whole as evidencing enough violations to support the 
congruence and proportionality of abrogation of sovereign 
immunity for suits in the education context.156  The court 
acknowledged that “classifications relating to education only 
involve rational basis review under the Equal Protection 
Clause,”157 and differentiated public education from other public 
service contexts covered by Title II because of “the importance 
of education in maintaining our basic institutions and the 
lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child.”158  In 
this way, the court sought to distinguish “public education from 
other rights subject to rational basis review.”159 
If the Association for Disabled Americans court followed 
the reasoning of Judge Moore’s Popovich concurrence, it would 
have provided a better guide for courts deciding the abrogation 
question in future ADA Title II challenges in the education 
context.  Indeed, the court could have explicitly recognized that 
section 5 grants Congress the power to take “some affirmative 
steps to ensure that the disabled have access to governmental 
programs” and that they are not arbitrarily discriminated 
against.160  The Eleventh Circuit’s emphasis on the importance 
of education is significant and essential, but its sole reliance on 
  
 153 Id.  Interestingly, the plaintiff originally argued that the precedent of 
Garrett did not apply to claims for injunctive relief, but only to claims for money 
damages.  Ass’n for Disabled Ams. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1293 (S.D. 
Fla. 2001).  The district court rejected this argument in granting the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss because the “Eleventh Amendment bars suit against an 
unconsenting state for injunctive relief as well as for money damages.” Id. at 1295. 
This Note likewise does not separate the claims for equitable and compensatory relief 
in its abrogation analysis.   
 154 Ass’n for Disabled Ams., 405 F.3d at 959. 
 155 Id. at 958. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 957. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Ass’n for Disabled Ams., 405 F.3d at 957 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202, 221 (1982)). 
 160 Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, 820 
(6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Moore, J., concurring). 
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that importance leaves the decision vulnerable to future 
opinions emphasizing that education is not a fundamental 
right.  Because education does not implicate the Due Process 
Clause under our current constitutional jurisprudence, critics 
could argue that abrogation of sovereign immunity in 
legislation promulgated under the section 5 power enforcing 
the Equal Protection Clause is not justified.  While Association 
for Disabled Americans answered the abrogation question 
correctly, it left gaps in its reasoning. 
C. Lane and Education Claims Brought Against the State 
under ADA Title II 
1. Reiterating the Proper Standard 
Proper sovereign immunity abrogation analysis requires 
the two-step Lane inquiry that determines whether the 
legislation in question (1) expressly abrogates sovereign 
immunity, and (2) passes the Boerne proportionality test by 
being a congruent and proportional remedy to identified 
constitutional violations.  The ADA clearly indicates its 
intention to abrogate sovereign immunity.161  The Boerne 
proportionality test, involving definition of the “metes and 
bounds”162 of the right at stake and determining whether an act 
is prophylactic, congruent, and proportional, demands a more 
thorough analysis in the educational context than that 
performed in McNulty and even in Association for Disabled 
Americans.  The alternative approach that is consistent with 
Lane necessarily encompasses discussion of both the nature of 
the right to education and the legislative findings that support 
ADA Title II protection and abrogation of sovereign immunity 
in the educational context as an enforcement of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
2. Scope of the Right 
Education is not a fundamental right under the U.S. 
Constitution,163 but the Court has considered education to be 
“[p]erhaps the most important function of state and local 
  
 161 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518 (2004). 
 162 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001). 
 163 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973); 
Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 1998). 
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governments.”164  Equal protection demands that because state 
constitutions have chosen to provide public education,165 the 
right to an education “must be made available to all on equal 
terms.”166  Additionally, the Court has not considered disability 
a suspect classification.167  Therefore, equal protection of the 
laws prohibits only irrational disability discrimination in the 
education context.168   
McNulty did not acknowledge that constitutional 
violations of equal protection may occur as a result of irrational 
disability discrimination prohibited by the ADA Title II.  The 
McNulty court compared Lane’s language stating that 
infringements on access to courts warrant a “more searching 
judicial review”169 with the Cleburne determination170 that 
  
 164 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 165 See, e.g., MD CONST., art. VIII, § 1 (“The General Assembly, at its First 
Session after the adoption of this Constitution, shall by Law establish throughout the 
State a thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools; and shall provide by 
taxation, or otherwise, for their maintenance.”) 
 166 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.  See also John C. Eastman, When Did Education 
Become a Civil Right? An Assessment of State Constitutional Provisions for Education 
1776-1900, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 33 (1998) (discussing the right, or lack thereof, in 
state constitutions throughout U.S. history and concluding “[i]f many of the State 
constitutional provisions, even those that appeared obligatory, did not create in 
children a right to free education, the combination of those constitutional provisions 
and the statutes enacted under them, together with the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, did provide a right, not to education per se, but to an 
education equal to that being provided to others”). 
 167 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985).  
 168 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) 
(emphasizing “that States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make 
special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions toward such 
individuals are rational”). Garrett discusses the nonsuspect classification of disability 
and examines a nonfundamental protection against irrational disability discrimination 
in public employment.  The Garrett Court was looking at Title I, and, this Note argues, 
differs from Lane’s result because of the dearth of legislative history supporting Title I 
in the public employment context, not because of the nonfundamental nature of the 
right at stake. 
 169 McNulty v. Bd. of Educ. of Calvert County, No. Civ. A. DKC 2003-2520, 
2004 WL 1554401, at *10 (D. Md. July 8, 2004) (citing Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 
522-23 (2004)). 
 170 Interestingly, in a letter dated July 13, 1989, the Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, John P. Mackey, responded to Senator Coats’ concern about the 
immunity provision in the ADA, especially as regarding burden on the courts.  The 
correspondence did not address, however, any question as to the validity of abrogation 
of sovereign immunity generally. (Question by Senator Coats: “Section 603 waives the 
immunity of the states from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States.  Is this a back-door attempt to create a suspect class, i.e., the 
disabled, without any hearings or formal congressional finding?  What will be the effect 
on the backlog of cases in the federal courts?” Response from Deputy Assistant 
Attorney Mackey: “The ADA would establish a statutory prohibition of discrimination 
on the basis of disability by, inter alia, State and local governments.  We do not 
interpret the Act to change relevant constitutional standards, and would review 
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“state action affecting the disabled is subject only to rational 
basis review.”171 The McNulty court then used this comparison 
to establish a distinction between the Lane outcome and 
abrogation of sovereign immunity in the education context.  
The court failed to recognize that “Congress . . . has residual 
enforcement power for nonsuspect classes, because the Equal 
Protection Clause provides meaningful protection to all classes 
of persons.”172  The court’s limited analysis only attempted to 
demonstrate the scope of the right, not any impossibility of it 
being infringed.  To come to any conclusion on the abrogation 
question,173 the McNulty court should have considered the 
legislative history of Title II generally, and then, specifically in 
the education context.174   
In Association for Disabled Americans, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s analysis of the scope of the educational right took into 
consideration the importance of equal access to public 
educational services while acknowledging that only irrational 
disability discrimination is prohibited by the ADA Title II; in 
  
skeptically any proposal that it do so.  There have been hearings on the ADA, and it is 
now being considered for enactment by Congress according to established procedures.  
We have expressed concern that the legislation should in all areas include remedies 
designed to avoid excessive burdens on the judicial system.”).  Letter from Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General John P. Machkey to Senator Dan Coats (July 13, 1989), in 
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 816, 822 (G. 
John Tysse ed., 1991).  
 171 McNulty, 2004 WL 1554401, at *3 (citation omitted). 
 172 Colker, supra note 23, at 674. 
 173 McNulty, 2004 WL 1554401, at *3. (“A district court ‘ought to consider the 
issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity at any time . . . because of its jurisdictional 
nature.’”) (citing Suarez Corp. v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 227 (4th Cir. 1997)) (emphasis 
added). 
 174 The Lane Court used general violations in public services as a basis of the 
decision, distinguishing the case from Garrett in that Garrett had involved a claim 
against the state where most evidence of discrimination in the legislative history was 
in private employment.  Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522 (2004). The Lane Court 
used these general violations, as few involve access to courts specifically, see id. at 543 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), as well as the concern for the importance of the due 
process guarantee at issue to emphasize the congruence and proportionality of 
abrogation as applied to access to courts under Title II.  Because there is a substantial 
record documenting unconstitutional disability discrimination in public services (in 
contrast with the lack of such a record  in public employment cited in Garrett) and also 
in public education, the specificity of the record further bolsters support for the 
congruence and proportionality of the legislation without the identification of a 
fundamental right.  Clearly, the Lane Court did not require voluminous documentation 
of discrimination in access to courts specifically, but instead relied heavily on more 
general historical violations in public services with four specific references to access to 
courts.  Association for Disabled Americans similarly notes that the Lane Court looked 
at “the record supporting Title II as a whole” as well as mentioning specific violations 
in the administration of public education.  405 F.3d 954, 959 & 959 n.4 (11th Cir. 
2005). 
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doing so, the court engaged in a more accurate description of 
the right at stake than the McNulty court.175 This is the proper 
sketch of the educational right and should be the model that 
prevails in future cases examining this step of the analysis. 
3. Legislative History 
Once the “metes and bounds”176 of a particular right 
have been outlined, the next step in the proportionality test is 
to “examine whether Congress identified a history and 
pattern”177 of unconstitutional discrimination by the state 
against the disabled.  The ADA’s history demonstrates that 
Congress identified state discrimination to support Title II; 
moreover, Congressional findings outlined several specific 
instances of discrimination in public education.   
As a starting point, it is helpful to look at evidence in 
the record that was particularly lacking in Garrett and 
motivated the court there to conclude that sovereign immunity 
was not validly abrogated under Title I for discrimination in 
public employment.  In Garrett, the court repeatedly referred to 
the legislative history’s emphasis on “employment in the 
private sector”178 to argue against the possibility of legislation 
in proportion to any identified discrimination by the state in 
public employment.   
A Senate report179 supporting the ADA, almost 
immediately after recognizing persistent discrimination also in 
the areas of “public accommodations, public services, 
transportation, and tele-communications”180 and that “[p]eople 
with disabilities as a group occupy an inferior status socially, 
economically, vocationally, and educationally,”181 included the 
testimony of an individual who experienced discrimination 
resulting in her exclusion from public school.182  Interestingly, 
  
 175 Ass’n for Disabled Ams. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 405 F.3d 954, 958 (11th Cir. 
2005). 
 176 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001). 
 177 Id. See also Colker, supra note 23, at 667-69 (discussing importance of fact-
finding in section 5 enforcement power analysis). 
 178 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371 (citing S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 6 (1989)). 
 179 S. REP. NO. 101-116,  at 6. Also cited extensively in Garrett, 531 U.S. at 
370. 
 180 S. REP. NO. 101-116. 
 181 Id. (emphasis added). 
 182 Id. at 7.  Note that this type of anecdotal evidence is decidedly different 
from the anecdotes Garrett cites as never having been submitted to Congress and 
therefore not weighty.  Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370. 
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this Senate report also quoted testimony that alludes to the 
particularly profound effects discrimination has in schools: “As 
Rosa Parks taught us, and as the Supreme Court ruled thirty-
five years ago in Brown v. Board of Education, segregation 
‘affects one’s heart and mind in ways that may never be 
undone.’”183  The report continued to note instances of 
discrimination as it has affected schools and schoolchildren, 
citing the Supreme Court case Alexander v. Choate,184 which 
referred to an earlier case dealing with the exclusion from 
school of an academically competitive child with cerebral palsy 
because “his teacher claimed his physical appearance ‘produced 
a nauseating effect’ on his classmates.”185  This report pointedly 
referred to disability discrimination in the public schools as a 
pervasive problem and a major motivator for the enactment of 
the ADA before even discussing the specific legislation and its 
requirements.   
The House also noted disability discrimination in 
education, citing statistics reaching deep into the problems in 
our education system when it comes to providing equal public 
access, stating that current legislation has not changed the 
disappointing numbers186 and that “[f]orty percent of all adults 
with disabilities did not finish high school – three times more 
than non-disabled individuals.”187  Additionally, the report cited 
testimony regarding the inaccessibility of school buildings as a 
major problem and as indicative of the need for enforcement 
provisions that require real changes and accessibility.188  This 
evidence and need acknowledged in the legislative record 
stands in “stark”189 contrast to the lack of evidence in Garrett.190  
Thus, the evidence supporting Title II’s remedial measures as 
  
 183 S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 6 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 
(1954)). 
 184 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
 185 S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 7. 
 186 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32 (1989) (noting that this statistic existed 
“[d]espite the enactment of Federal legislation such as the Education for Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973”). See also S. REP. NO. 101-116, 
at 12 (citing testimony about the then extant nondiscrimination federal laws including 
the Rehabilitation Act that, because “tied to the receipt of Federal financial 
assistance[,] [result in] total confusion for the disabled community and the inability to 
expect consistent treatment”).  
 187 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32. 
 188 Id. at 40. 
 189 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (using 
this language to cite the differences between legislative history that has influenced the 
Court to uphold abrogation in the past and the history presented to support Title I). 
 190 See supra Part III.C 
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pertaining to the education context surpasses the Garrett 
evidence in volume and content, just as the evidence in Lane 
did.  
Importantly, the Lane Court also considered the 
evidence of constitutional violations in public services 
generally, with such violations supporting the validity of Title 
II remedies: 
[The evidence of constitutional violations,] together with the 
extensive record of disability discrimination that underlies it, makes 
clear beyond peradventure that inadequate provision of public 
services and access to public facilities was an appropriate subject for 
prophylactic legislation.191   
The Garrett majority clearly acknowledged the record’s 
accounts of state discrimination in public services and public 
accommodations addressed by Titles II and III of the ADA and 
criticized Justice Breyer’s dissent because “[o]nly a small 
fraction of the anecdotes [he] identifie[d] in his Appendix C 
relate to state discrimination against the disabled in 
employment.”192  Justice Breyer countered that “[t]here are 
roughly 300 examples of discrimination by state governments 
themselves in the legislative record.”193  Both opinions 
acknowledged the voluminous evidence supporting Title II 
legislation providing protection to people with disabilities in 
the provision of public services.194 
The Lane Court did a lot of the work for McNulty and 
Association for Disabled Americans in examining the 
legislative history of Title II.  The McNulty court could have 
  
 191 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (2004) (emphasis added).  See also 
supra Part III.C (discussing the categorical distinction (private vs. public employment) 
the Garrett Court relied on to find inadequate legislative history in contrast to Lane’s 
consideration of public services generally and the subcategory of access to courts). 
 192 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371 n.7. 
 193 Id. at 379. Justice Breyer goes on to emphasize, “I fail to see how this 
evidence ‘fall[s] far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional 
discrimination on which § 5 legislation must be based.”  531 U.S. at 379 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (citing the majority’s language).   
 194 Another useful comparison between the Court and the dissent in Garrett, 
and again in Lane, would address the amount of case law that supports the contention 
that Congress identified a history of unconstitutional disability discrimination in a 
particular area.  For example, in his Lane dissent Rehnquist points out that there are 
only two cases footnoted by the Court that actually found constitutional violations 
preceding the enactment of the ADA.  Lane, 541 U.S. at 544 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting).  This would not be a legitimate grievance in the public education context, 
considering the cases the court cites to, because they all precede enactment of the ADA 
in their findings of constitutional violations against people with disabilities in the 
education context.  See id. at 525 n.12. 
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looked at the Lane decision to make the broad determination 
that there was “widespread exclusion of persons with 
disabilities from the enjoyment of public services”195 
constituting equal protection violations.  Moreover, the 
legislative record demonstrated violations specific to the 
education context, findings that should strongly compel courts 
to proceed to the next step of the proportionality analysis when 
considering the right to equal protection in education.  
Association for Disabled Americans reflected properly on the 
legislative record behind the ADA Title II both generally and 
with respect to education-specific violations of equal protection 
harming individuals with disabilities.   
4. Congruence and Proportionality 
Once the underlying violations on which the legislation 
is based are clearly identified, the court must decide whether 
that legislation is congruent and proportional to remedying 
them.  The Lane Court decided, after identifying the “pattern of 
exclusion and discrimination”196 in the provision of judicial 
services, that “Title II’s requirement of program accessibility[] 
is congruent and proportional to its object of enforcing the right 
of access to the courts.”197  Comparing the pattern and history of 
discrimination and exclusion to assess whether the force and 
breadth198 of Title II affords the appropriate remedy for a 
specific right violation, the Lane Court considered several 
factors including the efficacy of prior legislation to address the 
constitutional violations and the internal limitations of Title II 
that make it a reasonable remedy.199  These same 
considerations should apply to examining abrogation in the 
education context. 
  
 195 Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (2004). 
 196 Id. at 531. 
 197 Id.  
 198 When “breadth” is discussed in the context of the ADA, it may be taken to 
mean different things.  First, it has been established, as is evident in both Garrett and 
Lane, that the Titles of the ADA can be considered separately in consideration of 
whether sovereign immunity is abrogated legitimately for private claims brought 
against the state.  Second, one may consider the breadth of each title individually and 
whether Lane’s as applied approach is warranted.  This Note accepts Lane’s as applied 
approach as consistent with the standard.  When discussing “breadth,” this Note is 
discussing the extent to which the legislation effectively remedies the violation of a 
particular right identified (or as applied to a particular right, not applied to all rights 
that it could possibly be applied to, i.e. hockey rinks to voting booths). 
 199 Lane, 541 U.S. at 531.  
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The Lane Court deemed the inefficacy of prior 
legislation aimed at the elimination of disability discrimination 
as a significant factor behind Congress’ adoption of the ADA.200  
The legislative findings generally evidence this failure of 
previous law, and the Lane Court understood that “Congress 
was justified in concluding that this ‘difficult and intractable 
problem’ warranted ‘added prophylactic measures in 
response.’”201  Similarly, “added” prophylactic measures are 
desperately needed in the education context.  The failure of 
education specific disability law is significant in the analysis of 
whether Title II was an appropriate remedy in the education 
context.   
The ADA’s legislative history cites the failure of the 
Rehabilitation Act202 specifically to remedy discrimination 
against the disabled and create consistency.203  The Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act,204 which focused on disability 
discrimination in the education context and served as the basis 
for many complaints regarding the provision of appropriate 
services to students, had been in effect for 15 years at the time 
the ADA was adopted; nonetheless, Congress found and 
documented persistent and egregious disability discrimination 
in the education context.   
Both McNulty and Association for Disabled Americans 
should have performed this piece of the Lane analysis as 
prescribed.  The McNulty court did not consider the legislative 
history of the ADA Title II with reference to educational 
violations, nor did it consider the inefficacy of prior legislation 
that might warrant its powerful remedy.  If the District Court 
of Maryland had considered legislation specific to education 
that was in effect at the time the ADA was adopted, it may 
have acknowledged that the ADA’s strong prohibitions and 
  
 200 Id.  
 201 Id. at 531 (quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 
(2003)). 
 202 See THOMAS F. GUERNSEY & KATHE KLARE, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 1-2, 
& n.5 (2001) (discussing the genesis of these laws and also how the requirement of a 
free and appropriate public education is similar under the ADA and section 504); see 
generally Ruth Colker, The Death of Section 504, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA 323 
(Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003) (discussing not only the prevalence of section 504 
cases in higher education, but the potential of the regulations implementing the ADA 
negatively affecting the success of 504 suits). 
 203 The report refers to the Rehabilitation Act specifically.  See supra note 187 
and accompanying text.  
 204 The EHA became the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act in 1990. 
20 U.S.C. § 1400-1487 (2000).  
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remedies were necessary because the inefficacy of prior 
legislation called for the “clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities,”205 especially in the education 
context.  The persistence of these violations despite prior 
remedial legislation led inevitably to the conclusion that 
stronger laws were needed.  The Lane Court’s discussion of the 
exact requirements of Title II – whether they met the need 
recognized by Congress while only prohibiting irrational 
disability discrimination in the education context – would have 
been appropriate for the McNulty court to consider.  Likewise, 
Association for Disabled American’s argument would have been 
stronger if it had outlined the inefficacy of prior legislation that 
warranted the passage of the ADA. 
The ADA’s internal limitations also make it an 
extremely reasonable response under Congress’ section 5 
enforcement power.  The “reasonable modifications”206 
requirement of Title II, and the theme of reasonable 
accommodations in the ADA as a whole, may be interpreted 
both to push the legislation past prior inadequate laws and to 
aim at congruence and proportionality.207  As the Lane Court 
emphasized in its examination of congruence and 
proportionality,   
Title II does not require States to employ any and all means to make 
judicial services accessible to persons with disabilities, and it does 
not require States to compromise their essential eligibility criteria 
for public programs.  It requires only “reasonable modifications” that 
would not fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided, 
  
 205 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000). 
 206 Id. § 12131(2). 
 207 For instance, “Robert Burgdorf, the principal drafter of the original version 
of the statute, calls the ADA ‘a second-generation civil rights statute that goes beyond 
the “naked framework” of earlier statutes and adds much flesh and refinement to 
traditional nondiscrimination law.’”  Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality, and 
Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1063 (2004) (quoting Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The 
Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation 
Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. L. REV. 413, 415 (1991). Rovner also insists 
that the Garrett decision was wrongly decided and portrays a “cramped” view of equal 
protection.  Id. at 1074.  Although this Note emphasizes that Lane is consistent with 
Garrett because of the different analyses under Title I and Title II resulting from the 
different levels of evidence, Rovner’s Garrett arguments can be seen as illuminating in 
consideration of courts like McNulty narrowing Lane.  Additionally, Rovner’s 
discussion about the changing conceptualization of disability behind the ADA is helpful 
in understanding the congressional intentions in light of the record of discrimination.  
Id. at 1064. 
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and only when the individual seeking modification is otherwise 
eligible for service.208 
The ADA is both more powerful than prior legislation 
and reasonable in its requirements, especially in the face of the 
voluminous record of constitutional violations it sought to 
remedy.209 
The McNulty court should have asked, even if the 
modifications required under the ADA are congruent and 
proportional to the targeted violations, whether abrogation of 
sovereign immunity was congruent and proportional in itself.  
In other words, it is necessary to consider whether the option to 
enforce private rights against states by making the states 
liable for monetary damages as well as injunctive relief is an 
appropriate remedy as applied in each public service context.  
Clearly, the Lane Court found the option of enforcement 
against the state via private suit congruent and proportional in 
light of the record of violations.  The Lane Court emphasized 
that “the question presented in this case is not whether 
Congress can validly subject the States to private suits for 
money damages for failing to provide reasonable access to 
hockey rinks, or even to voting booths, but whether Congress 
had the power under § 5 to enforce the constitutional right of 
access to the courts.”210  Similarly, the question here is limited 
to whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign 
immunity in enacting the ADA Title II to remedy persistent 
  
 208 Lane, 541 U.S. at 531-32 (2004) (internal citations omitted).  “As Title II’s 
implementing regulations make clear, the reasonable modification requirement can be 
satisfied in a number of ways . . . . And in no event is the entity required to undertake 
measures that would impose an undue financial or administrative burden, threaten 
historic preservation interests, or effect a fundamental alteration in the nature of the 
service.”  Id. at 532. 
 209 The argument for the congruence and proportionality of the use of the 
section 5 power to afford this measured remedy in the education context is strong 
because of the pointed and substantial legislation and the base assumption at the time 
the ADA was passed that there was simply not enough existing legislative protection 
for individuals with disabilities.  See  Colker, supra note 23, at 696.   
 210 Lane, 541 U.S. at 530-31. As the lower court discussed in Association for 
Disabled Americans v. Florida International University, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1295 
(S.D. Fla. 2001), it is possible to argue that the validity of abrogation may be 
determined by examining the congruence and proportionality with respect to relief 
requested – money damages versus equitable injunctive relief.  See supra note 153 and 
accompanying text.  The Lane Court found that states are not immune from actions for 
money damages for violations of the ADA Title II; this Note argues that there is no 
need to separate the types of relief as the less costly injunctive relief would have been 
found, as it was by the Eleventh Circuit in the context of education, to be congruent 
and proportional under the Lane analysis. 
630 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
irrational disability discrimination in the context of public 
education.   
D. Education’s Position on the Spectrum: Closer to a Voting 
Booth than to a Hockey Rink 
This Note assumes that the McNulty court’s basic 
conclusion about the scope of the right to education is correct: it 
is not fundamental.211  Although the McNulty court interpreted 
the scope of the right correctly, it failed to draw from prior 
education case law demonstrating that the provision of 
education to people with disabilities cannot be equated to the 
scope of the right defined in Garrett. 
The “ordinary considerations of cost and convenience”212 
may not serve as the rational basis exempting state 
accommodation in the education context as easily as it may in 
other contexts.  Education’s place on the spectrum between 
voting booths and hockey rinks requires special consideration 
in the abrogation analysis.  Lane countenanced such unique 
treatment when it discussed the petitioner’s contentions and 
the spectrum of rights Title II purports to protect.  The 
language the Court used aligns public education and voting 
booth access on one side of the spectrum and positions hockey 
rink access on the other.213  Education, and its nonfundamental 
but “important,” even essential, status in Supreme Court 
precedent,214 supports a unique approach to the abrogation 
  
 211 Thus Congress is only to look to the object of protecting people with 
disabilities from irrational disability discrimination in the education context as 
Congress would in the employment context to determine the validity of the wielding of 
section 5 enforcement power.   
 212 Lane, 541 U.S. at 533. 
 213 “According to petitioner, the fact that Title II applies not only to public 
education and voting booth access but also to seating at state-owned hockey rinks 
indicates that Title II is not appropriately tailored to serve its objectives.  Id. at 530.  
Interestingly, this language is very similar to that of Moore’s in Popovich.  See infra 
Part III.D. 
 214 Of course, this essentiality is most notably emphasized in Brown v. Board 
of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). This Note does not argue for the constitutional 
status of education in and of itself, just that the importance of education should play 
into the congruence and proportionality assessment and that the Court has accorded 
education special status that may do this without changing the way education rights 
are currently conceptualized.  For the argument that education may be considered “an 
unenumerated affirmative” constitutional right, see Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical 
Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the 
End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550, 553 (1992). Bitensky also 
notes origins of a “negative right” to education originating with Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923), and persisting into today through substantive due process’ liberty 
interest.  Id. at 563-64. 
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analysis in the education context specific to education’s 
important position in our rights history.215  This unique 
approach to education is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of alleged constitutional violations in the education 
context, beginning with Brown v. Board of Education. 
Brown, in finding that segregation of public schools 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution,216 introduced the language the 
Court uses to the present day to describe the role of public 
education in our society, which does not define any positive 
constitutional right to education through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.217  Importantly, in 
  
 215 This Note does not argue that the importance of education requires 
“creat[ing] substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal 
protection of the laws.”  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 
(1973).  It does, however, acknowledge Rodriguez’s instruction that  
the key to discovering whether education is “fundamental” is not to be found 
in comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to 
subsistence or housing.  Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education 
is as important as the right to travel.  Rather, the answer lies in assessing 
whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by 
the Constitution. 
Id. at 33-34.  For the argument that this right is implicit in the Constitution, see 
Bitensky, supra note 214, at 553. See also Kristen Safier, Comment, The Question of a 
Fundamental Right to a Minimally Adequate Education, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 993, 1020 
(2001) (arguing that the Rodriguez court left open the possibility of finding a 
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education implicit in the Constitution).  
This Note argues that the current state of the law and conceptualization of the “right” 
to education allows for special weight in the abrogation analysis.  This is not an 
argument for finding a fundamental right to a minimally adequate education through 
the protections of substantive due process such that would be enforced through section 
5.   
 216 Brown held that: 
[T]he plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been 
brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  This 
disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also 
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (1954). Brown was decided on segregation being 
unconstitutional rather than on education as a fundamental right, but nevertheless 
extolled the importance of education in its finding. 
 217 The Brown Court emphasized that:  
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments.  Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.  Today it is a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing 
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to 
his environment.  In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably 
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.  
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making this finding that segregation violated the guarantee of 
equal protection, the Court emphasized that the assessment 
“must consider public education in the light of its full 
development and its present place in American life throughout 
the Nation.”218  The Court unequivocally asserted the 
importance of education, and the responsibility of the states to 
make it available to everyone equally once they provide it.  Due 
partly to this language emphasizing education’s critical value 
to citizenship and our democracy, the Court later grappled with 
the divide between the importance of this right and arguments 
that it may one day be established as a constitutional right 
implicit in the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.219 
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 
the Supreme Court upheld Texas’ school financing system 
against equal protection and substantive due process 
challenges.220  The Court refused to apply strict scrutiny and 
rejected wealth as a suspect classification and education as a 
fundamental constitutional right.221  Applying rational basis 
scrutiny, the Court found that the taxing system combined 
with the state interest of maintaining local control over 
institutions of public education222 “abundantly” satisfied the 
rational basis standard.223  The Rodriguez court did, however, 
leave the door open for future decisions to find that “some 
identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally 
protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise” of other 
rights including First Amendment rights and utilization of the 
  
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right 
which must be made available to all on equal terms. 
Id. 493 (emphasis added). 
 218 Id. at 492-93. 
 219 Justice Marshall’s Rodriguez dissent echoed some of the Brown language 
that emphasized the intersection of education and citizenship: “the majority’s holding 
can only be seen as a retreat from our historic commitment to equality of educational 
opportunity and as unsupportable acquiescence in a system which deprives children in 
their earliest years of the chance to reach their full potential as citizens.” Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. at 70-1 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The tension between Marshall’s 
dissent and the majority opinion in Rodriguez exemplifies how the Court has struggled 
to find the appropriate characterization of the right to education.   
 220 Id. at 18. 
 221 Id.  
 222 Id. at 49-51. 
 223 Id. at 55. 
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vote.224  The Court also suggested that complete deprivation of 
education might implicate such a constitutional protection.225   
Plyler v. Doe226 took up this latter question.  In Plyler, 
the Supreme Court applied a heightened standard of scrutiny 
and upheld an equal protection challenge to a Texas law.227  The 
law denied undocumented children the free public education 
available to children who were citizens or of other legal 
statuses.228  In rejecting the Texas law, the Supreme Court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ classification argument, finding no basis 
in the law for deeming illegal aliens to be a suspect class.229  
Instead, the Court seemed to base its heightened standard for 
the Texas law on “well-settled principles”230 that 
overwhelmingly consist of examples of education’s 
“fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.”231  
The Plyler Court emphasized the importance of education to 
our society politically, culturally, and constitutionally.232  
Interestingly for the purpose of this discussion, Plyler also cited 
the government barriers to education as offensive to equal 
protection’s goals of advancement based on individual merit 
and the importance of education in preparing people to be self-
reliant,233 goals similar to those the Americans with Disabilities 
Act cited eight years later.234  This extensive outlining of 
  
 224 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973).  The Court did not find that particular 
question before it though, asserting that the students in the Texas system were not 
alleging that “the system fail[ed] to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire 
the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full 
participation in the political process.”  Id. at 37. 
 225 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37. See also Bitensky, THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
supra note 214, at 566-68 (outlining the evolution of the question of whether an 
affirmative constitutional right to education exists and pointing to Rodriguez as the 
beginning of the Court’s discourse on the existence of such a positive right). 
 226 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 227 Id. at 229-30 (emphasizing that “[i]f the State is to deny a discrete group of 
innocent children the free public education that it offers to other children residing 
within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some 
substantial state interest”) (emphasis added).  
 228 Id. at 205.  
 229 Id. at 219 n.19. 
 230 Id. at 223. 
 231 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221. 
 232 Id. at 221-22. 
 233 Id. 
 234 The ADA clearly states that the disadvantaged position of people with 
disabilities in our society has “been based on characteristics that are beyond the control 
of such individuals and [result] from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the 
individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.”  42 
U.S.C. § 12202 (a)(7) (2000).  This section also highlights that “the Nation’s proper 
goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full 
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education’s importance included the Court’s assertion that 
although education is not a fundamental constitutional right,  
“neither is it merely some governmental ‘benefit’ 
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare 
legislation.”235  Plyler attributed an importance to education 
that transcends the more common association to participation 
in the democratic process via meaningful voting; the Court 
discussed how education reflects on success in areas of 
personhood and not just citizenship, as noncitizens play 
important roles in American society.236   
After the Court discussed education’s elevated role in 
society, it began to review the Texas law excluding 
undocumented children.237 The Court considered the children’s 
lack of responsibility for their immigration statuses.238  
Additionally, perhaps spurred by the dicta in Rodriguez, the 
Court indicated that this case was unique because it addressed 
a complete deprivation of education, rather than a more fluid 
and difficult allegation of an inadequate education.239 
Significantly, the Court stated that it “may appropriately take 
into account [the] costs to the Nation”240 of the law in 
determining whether the Texas statute could be upheld and 
found that only substantial interests would support rationality 
of the law, relative to the extreme costs of depriving children of 
education.241  The court found none of the three discernible 
state interests – protection from the entry of illegal 
  
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.”  
Id. at § 12202 (a)(8). 
 235 Id. at 221.  This also may provide an interesting contrast to the Rodriguez 
language that highlights the inability of the court to apply a higher level of scrutiny to 
Texas’s financing structure because of the Court’s traditional deference to state 
substantive economic and social policy.  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973). The Rodriguez Court directly compared education to the 
provision of welfare benefits in support of its application of the deferential rational 
basis review, citing the added complexities of state provision of public education as yet 
another reason to apply the lower standard.  Id. at 40-43.  In contrast, the Plyler court 
differentiated education from other benefits and used this differentiation to support its 
application of a heightened standard of review.  Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-24.  
 236 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222 n.20. 
 237 Id. at 223. 
 238 Id. at 224. 
 239 The Rodriguez Court depended heavily upon the lack of absolute 
deprivation to reject the equal protection challenge to the Texas law.  The Court 
emphasized that the claim of an inadequate education provided to one group does not 
support the finding of a suspect classification because no “system [can] assure equal 
quality of education except in the most relative sense.”  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20-5 (1973). 
 240 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224. 
 241 Id. 
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immigrants, prevention of the burden on the overall quality of 
education,242 and distinction based on unlawful status – 
substantial enough to justify the statutory deprivation of 
education to undocumented children.243   
E. Significance of Context: Education in the Abrogation 
Analysis 
The status of education in our history should not have 
altered the McNulty court’s assertion that disability is not a 
suspect class and that education is not a fundamental right 
under the Federal Constitution,244 regardless of whether the 
Court has left the latter question, at least as to a minimally 
adequate education, open.  These decisions do, however, 
underscore the importance of education and the Supreme 
Court’s willingness to acknowledge the ties that education has 
to participating meaningfully in the democratic process, and 
particularly in exercising the vote.  Notably as well, the Court 
has detailed the importance of education in other areas of 
American society, even for individuals unable to exercise the 
vote.245 Faced with an equal protection challenge to a law that 
deprived noncitizens of an education, the Court even applied a 
heightened standard of scrutiny when the allegation involved a 
nonsuspect class, asserting the costs to the nation of 
educational deprivation as an influential factor.246   
When it comes to the abrogation analysis, a court 
considering whether Title II validly abrogates Eleventh 
Amendment immunity in the education context must not only 
consider the explicit scope of the education right and the 
legislative history documenting unconstitutional violations.  It 
must also consider the importance of education in our society 
and the way that importance has influenced the Court’s equal 
protection review.  McNulty did not reach the merits of the 
case, but dismissed the Title II claim outright because 
  
 242 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229 (finding no evidence that including undocumented 
children in the classroom had a negative impact on the quality of education).   
 243 Id. at 228-30 (“It is thus clear that whatever savings might be achieved by 
denying these children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs 
involved to these children, the State, and the Nation.”). 
 244 All state constitutions currently provide for the right to education to some 
degree.  Eastman, supra note 166, at 2, 33.  
 245 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 n.20 (1982). 
 246 Id. at 224. 
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education is not a fundamental right.247  Association for 
Disabled Americans appropriately emphasized the uniqueness 
of education but failed to discuss the basic constitutional floor 
prohibiting irrational discrimination against the disabled.  
Focusing on the nature of the right without acknowledging the 
legitimacy of legislation abrogating sovereign immunity via the 
section 5 power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, left 
education decisions vulnerable in the future.  The Supreme 
Court’s reflections on challenges in the education context 
should influence section 5 analysis when Congress has 
purported to invoke its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
power to preserve the equal protection guarantee.  
V. CONCLUSION 
McNulty did not draw much from the Lane analysis, but 
simply used the Court’s fundamental rights language to 
summarily foreclose the validity of abrogation as applied to 
nonfundamental rights like education.248  Instead, the McNulty 
court should have considered whether Lane invited a deeper 
analysis of each case of discrimination in public services.  
Association for Disabled Americans properly considered the 
importance of education and the legislative history behind the 
ADA, but it failed to address the validity of affirmative section 
5 legislation enforcing the equal protection guarantee in areas 
that do not generally implicate fundamental rights.  The Lane 
analysis, sticking to standard evaluation of the section 5 
enforcement power and only modifying as required for the facts 
of the case, called for consideration of the scope of the right at 
stake, the legislative history describing pervasive violations, 
the weaknesses of prior legislation that prevented amelioration 
of disability discrimination, and the special status the U.S. 
Supreme Court has accorded education.  Only after such 
  
 247 McNulty v. Bd. of Educ. of Calvert County, No. Civ. A. DKC 2003-2520, 
2004 WL 1554401, at *3 (D. Md. July 8, 2004). If the McNulty court had applied the full 
abrogation analysis that Lane demanded, the U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of 
education under equal protection analysis may have affected not only the 
determination of whether Title II validly abrogates sovereign immunity, but also the 
substantive analysis of McNulty’s claim.  For instance, McNulty’s suspensions may 
have been alleged to constitute a deprivation of education, or a deprivation of a 
minimally adequate education, thus invoking discussion of some of the Court’s 
language in Rodriguez and Plyler.  Perhaps such allegations would have amounted to 
the finding of irrational disability discrimination in school, or even given rise to the 
debate about whether education’s constitutional status should be reconsidered.   
 248 Id. at *3.  
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analysis could the McNulty and Association for Disabled 
Americans courts have made thorough determinations as to 
whether sovereign immunity was validly abrogated for ADA 
Title II challenges against states in the educational context. 
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